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Abstract 
The paper discusses the relative importance of the “real” political actions versus the changes 
of symbolic nature in the bargaining over devolution, studying the case of personnel decen-
tralization in security agencies in Russia in 2000-2007. While in the 1990s under Boris Yel-
tsin regional branches of federal ministries in Russia were mostly captured by regional gover-
nors, allowing them to pass acts directly contradicting federal law, in 2000s the administration 
of Vladimir Putin gradually replaced the heads of regional branches by new bureaucrats, sup-
posedly without any connections to the region. The results differ for different security agen-
cies; however, the paper finds, surprisingly, that in several cases the appointment decisions 
were robustly influenced rather by symbolic gestures made by regional governments in the 
earlier bargaining process than by the actual devolution policies of the regions. 
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1  Introduction 
  The games of devolution and secession are rarely simply an issue of the distribution of 
economic resources and rents, as it is assumed in most economic models, starting from the 
seminal paper of Buchanan and Faith (1987). In fact, politicians seem to pay even a greater 
attention to “symbolic” gestures in negotiations – for example, public declarations of inde-
pendence and sovereignty or re-naming local political institutions to resemble those of “ma-
ture” nations - than to real re-allocation of control. In many cases “hidden” redistribution of 
power is tolerated by the central government, but open opposition is suppressed with brute 
force – although there are no changes in terms of economic resources and authorities. Stated 
otherwise, ego-rents outweigh “measurable” economic resource in these conflicts.  It may 
take extreme proportions: for example, mainland China invests significant effort to prevent 
the “formal” secession of Taiwan (i.e. declaration of its independence from the Republic of 
China) – although one can hardly expect this hypothetical event to make a significant differ-
ence in terms of Beijing’s ability to influence the decisions made in Taipei. The importance of 
symbols may be one of the reasons why political conflicts between the central government 
and the regional administrations are systematically associated with significant costs in terms 
of resources, but also often human lives. Abbink and Brandts (2007) show in an experimental 
paper that in an environment where an arrangement between the central and the regional gov-
ernments exists, which should prevent violent and costly conflict, subjects still act in a way 
resulting in substantial amount of fighting.  
However, while the importance of symbols and emotions in the secession and decen-
tralization cases is hardly in dispute, their relative importance as compared with the “calcula-
ble” gains from resources and power is extremely difficult to study empirically. Young (2004) 
demonstrates that discussion of secessions often either over-value the “economic reasoning” 
underlying these conflicts, or “give up” by describing secessions as products of emotions and 
passion. The relative importance of “real world policies” and “symbolic gestures” as reasons 
for fighting the secession is in dispute even in the well-studied secession conflicts, like the 
American Civil War (see Liscow, 2007, for the literature review). This paper makes an at-
tempt to empirically differentiate between the effects of these different motives in the decen-
tralization bargaining, looking at the re-centralization in the Russian Federation under the 
president Vladimir Putin and using a unique dataset on personnel of regional branches of Rus-
sian security agencies from 2000 to 2007. 
  Since its very establishment in 1991, Russia developed as a dual federation: functions 
reserved to federal government, but requiring presence of the central officials in the regions, 
were implemented by the regional branches of the federal agencies rather than delegated to 
regional governments (similar to the US and different from the German “cooperative” model). 
Hence, most Russian ministries and governmental bodies exhibit also a large network of re-
gional offices. Nevertheless, during the 1990s a common problem of these structures has been 
the “capture” of branches of federal agencies by regional governments: officials of the federa-
tion were poorly paid and weakly supported by the center, and at the same time remained in a 
particular region for decades, thus providing excellent opportunities for regional governors to 
establish informal relations by providing benefits and protection – as it has, in fact, been prac-
tices even in the Soviet Union of the post-Stalin era. Vladimir Putin after his election to the Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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presidency in 2000, considered his priority objective to “clean up” this patronage system, 
partly by replacing the officials from the regions by new appointees, usually with very limited 
connection to their new territories. 
  The paper looks at the outcomes of this policy, focusing on probably the most sensi-
tive part of governmental functions in Russia – police and internal security service. These 
structures are especially important in order to maintain the territorial integrity of the federa-
tion – a problem which has been considered as non-trivial during the first decade after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and an often claimed priority for the Putin’s administration. In 
particular it tests whether federal government (or, in the case, presumably, mostly Vladimir 
Putin himself) by their decisions focused rather on public claims the regions made about their 
desire to achieve higher autonomy or by the real actions of the regional governments. The 
results are mixed and depend upon the security agency in question; however, for at least one 
of three agencies studied I find strong evidence that the public claims had a significant impact 
on personnel decision making even after controlling for real actions, while the latter turn out 
to be insignificant. Paraphrasing the title of the paper, words matter more than deeds. The 
result seems to be robust to model specification and estimation method.  
  The paper is to our knowledge the first attempt to explicitly contrast the role of sym-
bolic actions and real re-allocation of resources in a game of secession using econometrical 
evidence rather than case studies or experiments. In a way, the paper contributes to the grow-
ing literature on the determinants of decentralization in the economics of federalism (e.g. Pa-
nizza, 1999; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005; Feld et al., 2008); however, unlike almost all pa-
pers in the literature, its reasoning is driven by the attempt to explain rather the “supply” of 
autonomy by the federal center than the “demand” of the regional governments. It is well-
known that decentralization in federations has a variety of aspects, which may or may not 
correlate to each other (Blume and Voigt, 2008). One almost always ignored aspect of decen-
tralization relates to the ability of central government to control regional governors. However, 
treating this dimension seriously can often result in complete re-evaluation of the decentrali-
zation practices: for example, unitary states may turn out to be extremely decentralized (if the 
central government is weak or strategically prefers limited intervention in the regional af-
fairs), or, on the contrary, strict control over appointment policy can effectively counteract 
formal decentralization. This is exactly what has been shown in the to our knowledge unique 
examination of informal appointment practices in the context of decentralization by Sheng 
(2007), who looks at the appointment of Chinese provincial governors – which, however, did 
not look at the possible differences between “words” and “deeds” as this paper does. Bai et al. 
(2008)  also  discuss  this  issue  of  a  “bureaucratic  integration”  in  China,  but  in  a  different 
framework, where the focus is the market integration and not the determinants of decentrali-
zation. In addition, one could relate our results to a larger problem of the impact of non-
credible threats on political bargaining, as it will be discussed in what follows.  
The paper is thus organized as follows. In the next section I discuss the institutional 
setup of this study and also specify the empirical design. The third section provides an over-
view of the data and econometric strategy of this paper. The fourth section reports the results. 
The fifth section looks at a number of extensions and robustness checks. The last section con-
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2  Informal decentralization in Russia 
  The development of the Russian Federation in the 1990s can be summed up by two 
contradicting trends. On the one hand, the structure of Russian fiscal and regulatory federal-
ism established in the early 1990s implied the creation of a highly centralized federation. Fed-
eral government had an almost unique authority over collection of taxes and decisions regard-
ing tax rates and bases; in most areas of regulation regional administrations were restricted by 
detailed federal standards, which were to be implemented by regional branches of federal ser-
vices. At the same time, the weakness of the central government allowed the regions to im-
plement a variety of measures of informal decentralization, resulting in de-facto shift of fiscal 
revenue and regulatory power in favor of regional governments. Probably, the most notorious 
example of this policy was the so-called “war of laws”: regional parliaments and governors 
issued their own acts in a variety of areas of regulation, directly violating federal law (Polish-
chuk, 2001). In order to implement this regional legislation, control over courts and police 
was required; however, these agencies remained de-jure part of the federal administration. 
Hence, it was publicly perceived that regional governments attempted to “capture” federal 
agencies by establishing informal ties with their directors and providing additional benefits 
(e.g. housing assistance) (Enikolopov et al., 2000).  Since most regional governments indeed 
managed to set up a large portion of acts contradicting federal law without any interventions 














Figure 1: War of laws in the Russian Federation 
Source: Ministry of Justice, 2006 Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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The conformity of regional law to federal legislation, as well as capture of regional 
branches of federal agencies have been unequally distributed over the territory of the Russian 
Federation. While some regions experienced stronger de-facto devolution, others (as Figure 1 
clearly demonstrates) preferred less “aggressive” attitude towards the federal government. It 
seems plausible to expect these differences to be a function of bargaining power of individual 
regional governors vis-à-vis federal center. In fact, the 1990s have been a well-documented 
period of a “bargaining federalism” in Russia: most decisions on regional and federal level 
became subject to bilateral bargaining between individual federal agencies and regional ad-
ministrations (Solnick, 2002). One can indeed show that the number and share of acts contra-
dicting federal law are positively correlated with the factors representing bargaining power of 
regional governments (Libman, 2010). 
This informal decentralization in the Russian Federation became one of the major con-
cerns for the government of Vladimir Putin, which replaced the weak regime of Boris Yeltsin 
in 2000. In particular, two sets of measures (among other reforms, which seem to be less rele-
vant in the context of this paper, but basically supported sift of the power towards the federal 
center from the regional governors) were implemented. First, Putin called for preparing an 
“inventory” of regional legislation in order to find out its conformity with the federal law. The 
task was originally assigned to a special committee, but was later transferred to the Ministry 
of Justice. During the first half of the 2000s the federal government was able to establish the 
so-called Federal Register (federal’nyi registr), or catalogue of regional acts (both of the leg-
islatures and of executive bodies, but incorporating legal norms). The catalogue included both 
norms in power and invalid acts of regional administration, and categorized them as “con-
forming” and “non-conforming” with the federal law (according to the decision of the experts 
of the Ministry). Based on this information, Putin initiated a number of lawsuits aiming to 
remove at least the most obvious violations of federal law; in fact, a number of decisions of 
the Constitutional Court and other courts, as well as continuing pressure on regional govern-
ments indeed allowed his administration to close the gap between federal and regional law 
(Ross, 2003; Kahn et al., 2009).  
The second part of the reform agenda included the systematic changes in the personnel 
policy for regional branches of federal agencies. In particular, Putin supported a much strong-
er monitoring of regional part of federal bureaucracy by central agencies, as well as gradually 
replaced the heads of the federal agencies in the regions. A probably most suitable example is 
the federal Ministry of Interior (which is in Russia responsible for police): in 2001 it changed 
the heads of its regional branches in 7 regions; in 2002 it were 13 regions, in 2003 25 regions 
and in 2004 22 regions. The appointments supposedly focused on replacing people with long-
term connection to the region (often working there for decades or even coming from this re-
gion originally) by people without close ties to the territory – and therefore supposedly less 
likely to be captured by regional governments (Voronov, 2005). However, the appointment 
policies differed significantly in various regions: while in some cases presidential administra-
tion preferred a prompt and radical solution, other directors of regional agencies maintained 
their position. 
It is possible to hypothesize that the appointment decisions could be driven by one of 
two contradicting approaches. On the one hand, it seems to be reasonable to appoint bureau-
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gaining power. In this case federal administration receives an opportunity to exercise stronger 
control over regional legislation in territories where regional governments are especially pow-
erful and hence prone to implementing their own policies. However, on the other hand, there 
are reasons to be more cautious in appointment decisions influencing these influential regions 
with strong governors able to offer resistance to new officials on both regional and federal 
level – in particular, absence of cooperation of regional government could become a major 
problem for any federal agencies operating in the region; moreover, these strong governors 
usually also have significant influence on federal arena, which certainly increased during the 
Putin’s rule, but never became equal to zero. It should be noted that the power of governors 
has been often based on strong connection to major business groups in the region, as well as 
(at least in the most influential cases) indirect and even direct control over attractive assets. 
Hence, federal government could prefer “pacifying” these regions by either maintaining old 
personnel or replacing old bureaucrats with the new officials, which still had strong ties to the 
regions. On the other hand, in order to justify the publicly announced program of supporting 
the “unity of the legal space” of Russia, federal government could become much more aggres-
sive by appointing officials in regions with lower bargaining power and weaker governors.
1  
Anyway, the appointment decisions of the Putin’s administration provide me with a 
unique opportunity to study the impact of symbolic gestures and real policies – i.e. “words” 
and “deeds” - on the political decision-making, as well as to generally analyze the logic of 
“appointment decentralization” in federations with strong hierarchical structures. In this paper 
I use a unique dataset of Petrov (2009) based on biographies of the heads of main Russian 
security agencies in the regions. The dataset contains observations for almost all Russian re-
gions for two points of time: January 2000 (the first month of Putin’s presidency
2) and July 
2007, towards the end of the second term of Putin, when the personnel re-appointment wave 
was almost completed. The dataset includes three types of agencies in the most “sensitive” 
area of Russian politics, which is undoubtedly security: 
•  Ministry of Interior: as mentioned, in Russia this institution has the functions of a 
“ministry of police”; 
•  Office of the Prosecutor (prokuratura), which is entrusted not only with prosecution in 
courts on behalf of the state and supervision of the observance of law, but also had 
(until recently and throughout the period of the study) its own criminal investigation 
division, and 
•  Federal Security Service (FSB), which is the main domestic security agency responsi-
ble for counterintelligence, counter-terrorism, anti-corruption and organized crime af-
fairs. 
                                                 
1 These two logics of behavior: punishing vs. pacifying the influential regional governors – have already been 
extensively studied for the logic of fiscal transfers of the Yeltsin government, however, different papers pro-
vide support for different results (Treisman, 1996; 1998; Popov, 2004; Jarocinska, 2004). 
2 Putin as the prime minister became president of Russia after Yeltsin resigned on December 31, 1999, since 
according to the Russian constitution in case of resignation of the president prime minister accepts this office 
for a limited period of time before new elections. The elections were held in March 2000. Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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Each observation (which is the head of a particular service in one of the Russian regions ei-
ther in 2000 or in 2007) is coded from 0 to 3, according to the relation to the region: 
•  0: no connection to the region of any kind before the current appointment; 
•  1: weak connections to the region; 
•  2: born in the region, but mostly with working experience outside the region; 
•  3: born in the region with long-term working experience in the region.
3 
Hence, it is possible to quantitatively assess the changes in the Putin’s personnel policy for 
regional branches of federal bureaucracy throughout his presidency period. In what follows I 
will refer to this index as “regional bias” for the federal officials. 
  In order to measure the “symbolic” activity of the regional governors I use the index of 
declarations of regional elites developed by Dowley (1998). The index is based on the sys-
tematic account of public events where regional governors participated in; each event is coded 
from 1 to 5 depending upon the degree of autonomy claimed by the regional governor on this 
particular occasion (where, for example, 5 stands for pursuit of independence from the federa-
tion, and 1 for opposition to federal arrangement of any kind and call for unitarism). The in-
dex is calculated for the period of 1991-1995 for all Russian regions. Given the time lag be-
tween the calculation of the index and the Putin’s appointment decisions, one can, on the one 
hand, avoid the reverse causality (and hence be sure that the endogeneity problem is irrelevant 
if all necessary controls are in place), and on the other hand, be sure that the federal govern-
ment observed the information before the re-appointment decisions were made.  
  As a measure of de-facto policies I take the share of acts contradicting federal law in 
total number of acts passed in the region, as it is reported by the Ministry of Justice in the 
Federal Register and applied by Libman (2010). It seems to be straightforward that this vari-
able represents the “real” policy implemented by the region in order to achieve higher auton-
omy from the federation. Moreover, one can be sure that in this case regional autonomy is not 
simply based on exercising its residual power, when federal government is not interested in 
regulating the particular area, but implies direct violations of the regulatory environment de-
liberately set by the federal administration. Once again, since the Ministry mostly catalogued 
acts of regions in the 1990s, and after 2000s the conformity of regional legislation with the 
federal law was ensured, the reverse causality problem seems not to be present (although in 
this case it is technically less straightforward, since the Register was created when Putin al-
ready became president during a couple of years, when old acts were included in the list 
alongside with the new ones). Moreover, by construction (based on the information from the 
Ministry of Justice) one can be sure that the de-facto policies were observed by the federal 
government alongside with the public claims of the early 1990s, and hence could be taken 
into consideration.
4  
                                                 
3 Since the typical mobility in the Russian bureaucratic hierarchy has been unidirectional and goes from the re-
gional administration to Moscow, and not between regions or from Moscow to the region, it has been (before 
Putin’s reforms) relatively unlikely for a person not born in the region to work there for a long time. 
4 It is possible to question whether the most appropriate measure is the share of contradicting acts, and not their 
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Figure 2: Declarations of elites and de-facto policies 
 
The relation between symbolic gestures and de-facto policies is in fact non-trivial. On 
the one hand, under Yeltsin the weak federal government aimed to form coalitions with re-
gional governors, thus probably exchanging possibilities of the de-facto devolution for loyal-
ist rhetoric (see Treisman, 1999). From this point of view, one could expect that the regions 
which are not so active in terms of making public claims in fact are “allowed” to pass a higher 
fraction of acts contradicting the federal legislation – or, on the other hand, that the public 
support of the president could be rewarded by providing benefits to governors, also in terms 
of “free hands” in the legislation (but also, maybe, federal grants and subsidies or higher quo-
tas in state-owned resource enterprises and access to privatized assets). Then one could expect 
a negative correlation between these two variables. On the other hand, it is also possible that 
the share of legislation contradicting federal law represents the divergence in the preferences 
between the region and the federation in total, as well as the public activity – then a positive 
correlation becomes possible. A simple graphical representation suggests that the de-facto 
policies and symbolic gestures are weakly positively correlated with each other (see Figure 2) 
– as one probably could expect; however, this effect vanishes if additional controls are taken 
                                                                                                                                                         
the correlation between number of contradicting acts and population – which, in fact, is simply an outcome of 
the overall strong positive correlation between law-making activity and size of the population of Russian re-
gions. Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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into account (Libman, 2010).
5 What is particularly important for me is that the correlation 
between these two variables is not high enough, and hence, they can be treated as separate 
determinants of Putin’s re-appointment policies, which are at the core of this paper.
6 
3  Data and econometric strategy 
  The basic regression implemented in the paper is very simple: I regress the change of 
the index of “regional bias” for directors of regional branches of three federal agencies be-
tween 2000 and 2007 on the measure of public statements, measure of de-facto policies and a 
set of controls potentially relevant for the federal decisions on personnel appointment. Given 
the nature of data, I calculate a cross-section for more than 80 Russian regions.
7 The depend-
ent variable is calculated as regional bias index of 2007 minus regional bias index in 2000; 
hence, it is smaller if a bureaucrat with strong ties to the region was replaced by a bureaucrats 
without any connection to the region (more “centralized” control over regional bureaucracy) 
and vice versa. A positive sign of covariates in the regression indicates that increase of this 
particular determinant leads to establishment of weaker federal control over region and vice 
versa. The dependent variable can be both negative (for example, if a bureaucrat with strong 
ties to the region – value of index 3 – was replaced by an external official – value of index 0) 
and positive. However, on average the variable is -1.3 for police, -0.4 for federal security and 
-0.7 for prosecutors (see Appendix A for descriptive statistics), suggesting that the federal 
government rather increased its control over regional branches.  
 
 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that both measures are not without caveats. As for the “deeds” variable, I cannot distinguish 
between different areas of legislation, although some of them may be more important for the bargaining agents 
than the other. As for the “words” variable, I do not know exactly the media used to communicate their re-
solve by the regional governors, as well as cannot control for the “amount of communication”, i.e. not just 
“what was said” but also “how often and how much”, although it could also matter. However, even under 
these restrictions, the indicators seem to be of use for the purpose of this paper. 
6 A particular advantage of the case used in this paper is that the action and the reaction in the political bargain-
ing process are separated by a relatively long time period of several years. Usually it is difficult to clearly 
identify the actions of political actors, since they happen roughly at the same time and the bargaining process 
is intransparent – so that only the results, and not the moves of the players are observed. It is particularly true 
for non-democratic regimes. 
7 Russian Federation included 89 regions in 2000 and 83 regions in 2007, since some of the territories were 
merged with others. Hence, in some cases regions ceased to exist in 2007 and no difference of the index of re-
gional bias can be calculated. One should note that mergers usually were rather “acquisitions” of a smaller re-
gion by its larger counterpart – hence, for the larger region index is available in 2000 and 2007. Moreover, I 
exclude Chechen Republic (a standard procedure for Russian data); in few cases I am forced to exclude re-
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Figure 3: Box plot for regional bias index 
 
Nevertheless, the changes seem to be different for different security agencies. Figure 3 
provides a box plot for the regional bias values before and after Putin’s personnel policy. One 
can clearly see that for the Ministry of Interior originally most federal officials had at least 
some connection to their region before Putin’s reforms, after reforms the median bureaucrat 
does not have any connection to the region, but the share of those with connections to the re-
gions is still substantial. For the Federal Security Service FSB the regional bias was substan-
tially smaller in 2000; in 2007 no smooth distribution could be derived. Finally, for the Prose-
cutor’s Office the variation was significant both before and after Putin’s reforms. Interestingly 
enough, change in regional bias for three agencies is uncorrelated at 5% significance level, 
and therefore reappointments seem to be relatively independent of each other (thus, one can 
exclude the option of “hostage exchange”, when, say a FSB head loyal to the federal govern-
ment is accepted in exchange for local prosecutor). The absolute level of regional bias in 2007 
is uncorrelated as well, in 2000 I find significant and positive correlation only for the Prosecu-
tor’s Office and Ministry of Interior (thus, while these two agencies may have developed in a 
similar way, FSB seems to have a different pattern even before Putin’s reforms). 
Given the nature of the dependent variable, I estimate ordered logit regressions and 
check for proportional-odds assumption using an LR test; as an additional robustness check 
OLS regressions are estimated. For OLS I also check for normal distribution of residuals us-
ing Jarque-Bera test; if it is significant I exclude the outliers until the normality hypotheses 
cannot be rejected, and analyze effects which remain robust after this procedure. For ordered 
logit, if the proportional odds assumption is violated, I estimate generalized ordered logit, and 
use for the interpretation the marginal effects at the mean of the sample and, once again, in-Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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terpret only results which remain robust after this procedure. The estimations are done for 
each individual agency. 
  The right-hand side variables include, as noticed: (a) the index of declarations of re-
gional governors; (b) the share of acts contradicting federal law in regional legislation and (c) 
a variety of other controls. These control variables include:  
•  Measures of secessionist potential of the region – whether the territory could be consid-
ered a candidate for seceding for the federation. In order to account for this factor, I use 
three variables: (a) distance between the regional capital and the City of Moscow; (b) 
dummy for the border regions and (c) share of ethnic Russians in the total population of 
the region; 
•  Economic potential of the region, which could influence its bargaining power potential 
(which can be implemented in negotiations with federal government and therefore influ-
ences its decisions): I use, once again, three indicators: (a) size of the regional territory; 
(b) size of its population and (c) share of oil and gas extraction in the region in the total 
extraction in the Russian Federation. 
•  Legal status of the region: Russian Federation “inherited” from its Soviet past regions 
with slightly different status. In particular, some of the constituents of the Russian Federa-
tion (with a significant  portion of ethnic non-Russian population traditionally residing 
there) have the status of “republics”; although the current constitution proclaims equal 
rights of all regions, republics de-facto often claim a higher degree of autonomy and influ-
ence in federal affairs. Hence, I include a dummy for republics to check for this effect. 
•  Political regime of the region: it is possible that the appointment policy reacted rather to 
the desire to restrict the development of “isles of democracy” (or, on the contrary, sup-
press regional authoritarianism) than to bargaining power. Hence, I include an index of 
democracy developed by Moscow Carnegie Center and based on expert opinion. 
•  An additional variable is a dummy for the Northern Caucasus region. The reason for this 
special treatment is the “Chechnya factor”: Northern Caucasus has been treated (at least, 
informally) as a territory of special concern from the military point of view, what has to 
manifest itself in the appointments in security agencies (which also partly have been in-
volved in open warfare in Chechnya in the 1990s, like the Ministry of the Interior, and 
still often engaged different military opponents in the 2000s). Thus, appointments in this 
small group of regions can be guided by a different factor than in the rest of the Russian 
Federation. 
For all time-varying repressors I take the average between 2000 and 2006; this is mostly un-
problematic because of limited changes in the values over time. One can clearly see that al-
most all variables included in the regressions are not subject to reverse causality (either by 
construction, or – as in case of population – due to relatively high stability of values). It is 
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relative stability over time and therefore the endogeneity problem is unlikely.
8 In the exten-
sions I will also add a number of variables to the regression, which may be more susceptible 
to the problem of the endogeneity. 
Moreover, I estimate a specification where I also add an index of power of regional 
governor in 1995-2000 (Jarocinska, 2004), which may in fact have influence the federal deci-
sion – once again, one can assume exogeneity by construction of the index. The index, on the 
one hand, may be considered the most “straightforward” form to measure bargaining power of 
the regions (as opposed to indirect characteristics described above). On the other hand, how-
ever, power index can also be treated as a measure of de-facto policies (similarly to share of 
contradicting acts), i.e. policy outcome rather than endowment (bargaining potential). Hence, 
any significant impact of this variable allows for multiple interpretations.
9 
Finally, I look at an additional specification of the regression. The decision of the fed-
eral government may as well be influenced not only by the characteristics of the region, but 
simply by the “degree of involvement” of federal bureaucrats in this region with the regional 
administration. Stated otherwise, “initial level” of regional bias may be significantly influenc-
ing the decisions of government. So, I estimate regressions where I add initial level of index 
in the year 2000 to the covariates. These regressions are reported in the Appendix B. 
To conclude, there are three main research issues I have to look at while doing the in-
ference. First, the main question of this paper is whether the “words” or (or, possibly, and) the 
“deeds” matter for the re-centralization. Hence, I look at the significance of both respective 
variables, in particular if they both are included in the regressions. Second, the sign of signifi-
cant control variables is able to show, whether the federal government was rather interested in 
restricting the activities of the strong regions, or in fact concentrated on the weak regions, thus 
creating a public impression of a re-centralization campaign, but not really involving itself in 
conflicts with strong governors. If the sign is positive, the federal government was more cau-
                                                 
8 Nevertheless, in order to check for the impact of potentially endogenous controls, I re-estimated all regressions 
of the Tables 1-3 (as well as all regressions of Appendix B) excluding democracy. There are virtually no 
changes for the Ministry of Interior. For the Federal Security Service Table 3 does not change; in Table B3 
population loses significance in several specifications. For the Prosecutor’s Office in Table 2 population loses 
significance; in Table B2 distance becomes more robustly significant (i.e. present in many specifications with 
a significant coefficient). To conclude, inclusion of democracy seems to be relevant for the effect of popula-
tion on appointment decisions and does not influence the effects of the main exploratory variables. 
9 It is possible to hypothesize that the federal government focuses on other policy variables reflecting decentrali-
zation rather than share of contradicting acts – for example, fiscal aspects of devolution may be more impor-
tant. Hence, I also estimated regression where average retention rate (share of total de-facto tax collection 
from region’s territory attributed to its consolidated budget) for 2000-2006 was added as a variable (regression 
estimated excluding autonomous districts, i.e. regions with lower political rights in Russia). However, all sig-
nificant results of Tables 1-3 did not change; the average retention rate was almost never been significant; so, 
omission of this variable seems to be unproblematic. One should notice that using retention rates is not consis-
tent with the type of agencies I am interested in: if one looks at the retention rates in Russia, actually not the 
security agencies, but the Federal Tax Service it the key player (cf. Libman and Feld, 2009). The choice of se-
curity agencies as the empirical playground for the paper is motivated by the importance of these structures for 
any country – and for Russia in particular – so, one is looking at the case for which politicians should make a 
great effort to make a “correct” decision – and it makes the results I report in what follows even more surpris-
ing.  Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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tious in relations with strong regions; if it is negative, the opposite is true.
10 Third, the addi-
tional specification of the Appendix B may show whether the federal government was rather 
interested in re-establishing control in regions with strong regional bias, or the initial regional 
bias did not really matter for the federal authorities, which looked at the “content” of center-
region relations and the power of the regional governors. 
 
4  Main results 
4.1  Ministry of Interior 
  The results of the baseline specification for the Ministry of Interior are reported in 
Table 1, and immediately provide some surprising evidence. The de-facto policies of federal 
government do not seem to be highly significant; however, declarations of regional gover-
nors matter for federal policy, even if one controls for de-facto policies (regressions (3) and 
(8)) and relative power of governors (regressions (5) and (10)).
11 Hence, the federal govern-
ment seems to pay more attention to what regional governors said, than to what they actually 
did. It should be noted that although the words and deeds variables are somewhat correlated, 
including both of them in the regression does have almost no effect on the size of the coeffi-
cient as opposed to the case when only one of them is present: so, my results are not driven by 
multicollinearity. 
  Moreover, as already mentioned, the results of the regressions could be used in order 
to assess the general logic of the (de)centralization by appointment in Russia. I find mixed 
evidence with respect to the objectives of federal government by deciding on new bureaucrats 
for its regional offices. Indeed, for Ministry of Interior federal government seems to follow 
the “aggressive” strategy for regions, which have the status of a republic (although results are 
not entirely robust), border regions and regions with large oil and gas reserves. However, for 
the share of Russians and declarations of regional elites the effect is the opposite: the federal 
government seems to be more cautious dealing with regions with high non-Russian popula-
tion  and  with  the  publicly  active  governors  in  the  1990s.  Hence,  the  federal  government 
seems to perceive different dimensions of bargaining power differently and therefore imple-
ment different policies. The positive sign of declarations is also worth noticing: the public 
claims seem to drive federal government to more cautious policies towards the regions, even 
if it is not related to the de-facto devolution.
12  
                                                 
10 Most covariates increase in bargaining power of the region. The exception is share of Russians: larger variable 
indicates lower share of non-Russian population and hence lower bargaining power. 
11 If one estimates the regressions from Tables 1-3 just with “words” (without “deeds” and power index) all 
results for declarations are confirmed in OLS and ordered logit. 
12 A further interesting finding, which will also persist for several other security agencies is the positive sign of 
the dummy Northern Caucasus. It is possible to hypothesize that this outcome reflects federal center’s desire 
to use local elites as their “power support” in the region instead of ruling through direct federal appointees – 
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  The statistical properties of the regressions are fine: Jarque-Bera test does not reject 
the normality of residuals in OLS, and LR test supports the proportional-odds assumption 
(and hence generalized ordered logit is not necessary). An additional robustness check, as 
noticed, implies the inclusion of initial regional bias in the regression. Indeed, the initial re-
gional bias is always significant and negative in all specifications, for all estimation tech-
niques and all three agencies (Appendix B), showing the general re-appointment trend from 
more regional bias to less regional bias. The results for Ministry of Interior (Appendix B, Ta-
ble B1) for public claims and observable real policies do not change. The exclusion of outliers 
in the OLS virtually never changes the results. Moreover, LR test for ordered logit in the key 
regressions (B8) and (B10) is not significant, so the application of generalized ordered logit is 
not necessary. 
The central result of this section - the importance of “words” for re-appointment deci-
sions, which seem to ignore the real actions of the governors - requires additional discussion. 
Generally speaking, several interpretations are possible, but the first three seem to be less 
likely for the Russian case – although with the tools of this paper clear discrimination among 
the hypotheses is impossible, and hence, one can only consider some of them as more or less 
probable).  
First, it is possible to assume that federal government still “expects” the threats made 
by the regions in the early 1990s to become policies in the future, and hence, is still unsure 
that the threats were “empty”. This is a possible, but relatively unlikely explanation: Russian 
politics is rather characterized by myopic than by too far-sighted behavior, as well as the so-
cial behavior in general (Rozmarinsky, 2004), and the changes of regional policies after 1995 
(the last year which is covered by the declarations index) have been substantial (however, in 
what follows I will show that the “memory” of the Russian politicians is not so short as one 
often assumes – and therefore the myopic behavior is also not straightforward).  
Second, the government may react on public opinion expecting re-elections, which in 
the  world  of  insufficiently  informed  and  emotional  voters  may  as  well  be  influenced  by 
“words” rather than “deeds”. For the Russian case, however, low degree of democracy also 
makes this explanation questionable.
13  
Third, one can be dealing with a purely “emotional” short-term response, and hence 
assume that politicians are completely irrational. However, irrational response is likely as a 
short-term reaction in a small group of regions: what I find is a reaction with a significant 
time lag, which also occurs systematically in more than 80 regions.  
                                                 
13 Certainly, even in a non-democracy “reputation” is important, and the public opinion could not be disregarded. 
However, the public point of view is at least usually not so important, as in a democracy, and can often be eas-
ily manipulated through the media control. On the other hand, a very relevant issue is the reputation of the 
leader in the relations with the elites: but in this case elites are often well-informed not only about words, but 
also about deeds. In addition, appointments are prepared by the bureaucrats of the presidential administration: 
here an additional level of information asymmetry is possible, and in this case recommendations could spe-
cifically be motivated by “words” due to the carrier concerns of bureaucrats attempting to create a decision the 
president will “like”: this speculation is, however, not testable in any rigorous sense.  Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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Fourth, the government could be concerned because “words” are better observable by 
other  regional  administrations:  so,  preventing  the  regions  from  being  more  aggressive  in 
terms of their public claims could be used to avoid the snowball effect of spreading aspiration 
for autonomy and to provide a signal for other regions. In addition, “words” are crucial if one 
is looking for the external support for the possible secession (since they can reach the external 
actors, relevant for the international recognition). This interpretation is not entirely consistent 
with the positive sign of the declarations variable. In addition, Gel’man (2006) shows that the 
group of Russian regions interested in higher autonomy has always been limited (even during 
the ultimate weakness of the federal government in the 1990s), while the rest of the regions 
were more interested in federal transfers than in increasing autonomy. Since the situation per-
sisted for almost a decade, there seems to be no reason for the Putin government to be very 
concerned with it. Nevertheless, this argument should be dismissed so easily. 
Finally, the last explanation means that federal government simply pays more attention 
to the claims of regional governments than to the de-facto policies; it may have preferences 
over content of communication (basically, it may (dis)like certain things governors say, re-
gardless of  what they do, since the  communication influences its ego-rents), which make 
“empty threats” relevant even if no political change is going on. In this case the federal gov-
ernment considered the dissolution of the “open rebellion” a more important issue than the 
fight against the “true” re-allocation of authorities. This result is in fact not surprising per se: 
since politicians are “just” human beings, there is no reason to believe that they act differently 
than people in other areas – where ego-rents and preferences over communication are obvi-
ously an issue. What is probably more amazing is the relative importance of the ego-rents for 
a key political decision-making area, where one would expect to see more dedicated calcula-
tion. However, once again, people seem to value status, honor and respect in the decisions of 
the “live and death” importance. One analogy could be that of criminal gangs: while there is a 
literature  looking  at  gangs  from  the  perspective  of  rational  rent-maximization  (Levitt  and 
Venkatesh, 2000), other papers confirm the relevance of the “content of communication” and 
status for their development (Horowitz and Schwartz, 1974). My results suggest simply that 
politicians are not different than the rest. 
The insignificant result for “deeds” should also be discussed. On the one hand, it is 
possible that it reflects the measurement problem: in this case regional acts simply did not 
matter for the economy, and hence unsurprisingly were ignored by the appointment policies. 
This claim, however, is not confirmed by numerous observations of the “war of laws” in Rus-
sia, which often refer to significant impact of regional legislation. Second, it is possible that 
other aspects of “real” devolution were more important – I have already checked for the reten-
tion rate and will explore this option in what follows as well. Finally, the result can be driven 
simply by the fact that facing a sophisticated and often costly (in terms of relations with re-
gional  governor)  re-appointment  decision,  federal  government  has  to  prioritize,  and  the 
“words” may have higher weight in the utility function. Nevertheless, to err on the side of 
caution, one should probably say that the obtained results do show a robust significant impact 
of “words”, while for “deeds” my findings can be driven by the absence of the “relevant” 
proxy. 
A further aspect to be taken into considerations is the institutional reforms imple-
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minister of interior (as well as prosecutor) was directly subordinated to the federal minister, in 
2007 there was an additional layer established: prosecutors and agencies of the Ministry of 
Interior on the level of the new “federal districts”: groups of regions directed by an appointed 
presidential representative. This layer is sometimes claimed to draw a significant portion of 
authorities from the actual regional level. Hence, it is possible that what I observe in the data 
also comes from the fact that the regional officials became less important: therefore the fed-
eral government could be willing to be more “open” to regional governors while appointing 
heads of regional security agencies, and at the same time maintain control through federal 
appointees in the federal districts (in this case the analysis of this paper is irrelevant: all dis-
tricts were established just in 2000 and were directed by officials without links to the regions 
– often from the military or the FSB). It could imply that the federal government does care for 
“words”, but only if consequences in terms of “deeds” are not dramatic (some results for the 
interaction terms reported in what follows could confirm this conclusion). Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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Table 1: Personnel appointment for the Ministry of Interior, dep.var.: difference in regional bias index 




























republic  -1.059**  -1.177**  -2.298***  -1.056**  -2.294***  -1.110  -1.287*  -3.368***  -1.121  -3.361*** 
  (0.509)  (0.498)  (0.647)  (0.508)  (0.650)  (0.782)  (0.761)  (1.131)  (0.760)  (1.122) 
Dummy 
border region  -1.031***  -1.044***  -0.884**  -1.021***  -0.878**  -1.369***  -1.387***  -1.233**  -1.360***  -1.224** 
  (0.329)  (0.328)  (0.345)  (0.328)  (0.345)  (0.493)  (0.493)  (0.524)  (0.491)  (0.518) 
Distance 
from Moscow  -0.017  -0.036  -0.077  -0.021  -0.080  -0.029  -0.056  -0.108  -0.043  -0.117 
  (0.072)  (0.079)  (0.082)  (0.072)  (0.082)  (0.114)  (0.123)  (0.135)  (0.110)  (0.132) 
Share  of 
Russians  -2.223**  -2.145**  -1.020  -2.160**  -0.982  -2.716*  -2.596  -1.052  -2.524  -0.952 
  (0.992)  (1.017)  (1.060)  (1.028)  (1.090)  (1.604)  (1.635)  (1.482)  (1.606)  (1.476) 
Territory  0.285  0.306  0.360  0.267  0.348  0.310  0.351  0.319  0.237  0.282 
  (0.783)  (0.804)  (0.790)  (0.792)  (0.800)  (1.889)  (2.028)  (1.774)  (1.705)  (1.682) 
Population 
(2000-2006)  0.015  0.017  0.003  0.009  -0.001  -0.030  -0.022  -0.042  -0.052  -0.055 
  (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.079)  (0.090)  (0.082)  (0.111)  (0.112)  (0.101)  (0.116)  (0.108) 
Oil and gas 
(2000-2006)  -2.860*  -2.877*  -4.032**  -2.933*  -4.075**  -5.130  -4.946  -8.022**  -5.522  -8.250** 
  (1.576)  (1.582)  (1.641)  (1.593)  (1.664)  (3.741)  (3.854)  (3.766)  (3.636)  (3.809) 
Democracy 
(2000-2006)  0.044  0.045  0.030  0.043  0.029  0.064  0.065  0.056  0.058  0.052 
  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.062)  (0.057)  (0.063) 
Dummy 
Northern 
Caucasus  1.522**  1.507**  2.199***  1.528**  2.201***  2.076**  2.082**  3.451***  2.126**  3.456*** 
  (0.596)  (0.595)  (0.588)  (0.605)  (0.594)  (0.928)  (0.926)  (0.971)  (0.943)  (0.966) 
Contradicting 
acts    2.654  2.66    2.706    3.891  3.506    3.610 
    (3.324)  (3.158)    (3.143)    (4.401)  (4.282)    (4.183) 
Declarations      1.440***    1.435***      2.512***    2.487*** 
      (0.522)    (0.527)      (0.921)    (0.924) 
Power  of 
governors        0.064  0.041        0.222  0.137 
        (0.292)  (0.291)        (0.398)  (0.413) 
Constant  -0.369  -0.632  -4.837**  -0.794  -5.100*           
  (1.150)  (1.252)  (2.120)  (2.273)  (2.835)           
Observations  79  79  79  79  79  79  79  79  79  79 
R
2  0.221  0.227  0.284  0.222  0.284           
Pseudo R
2            0.098  0.101  0.143  0.100  0.143 
LR  propor-
tional  odds 
test            44.76*  46.49  45.96  45.33  47.95 
J.-B. test  1.373  1.645  1.036  1.370  1.055           
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** 
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Table 2: Personnel appointment for Prosecutor’s Office, dep.var.: difference in regional bias index be-




























republic  0.513  0.696  1.479  0.513  1.481  0.498  0.757  1.683  0.497  1.684 
  (0.711)  (0.730)  (0.945)  (0.719)  (0.951)  (0.797)  (0.847)  (1.123)  (0.801)  (1.124) 
Dummy 
border region  -0.312  -0.275  -0.372  -0.311  -0.378  -0.456  -0.385  -0.523  -0.453  -0.526 
  (0.407)  (0.406)  (0.415)  (0.409)  (0.413)  (0.503)  (0.513)  (0.541)  (0.497)  (0.534) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.089  0.116  0.146  0.089  0.149  0.083  0.124  0.160  0.082  0.162 
  (0.085)  (0.089)  (0.092)  (0.092)  (0.099)  (0.101)  (0.102)  (0.107)  (0.108)  (0.112) 
Share  of 
Russians  0.889  0.716  -0.055  0.894  -0.088  0.597  0.511  -0.446  0.612  -0.462 
  (1.365)  (1.318)  (1.569)  (1.386)  (1.590)  (1.545)  (1.539)  (1.989)  (1.557)  (2.008) 
Territory  -0.520  -0.541  -0.583  -0.522  -0.574  -0.573  -0.612  -0.667  -0.577  -0.662 
  (0.456)  (0.479)  (0.469)  (0.473)  (0.480)  (0.542)  (0.566)  (0.553)  (0.562)  (0.572) 
Population 
(2000-2006)  0.267*  0.266*  0.276*  0.267*  0.279*  0.329*  0.335*  0.346*  0.328*  0.348* 
  (0.152)  (0.148)  (0.145)  (0.155)  (0.150)  (0.191)  (0.186)  (0.184)  (0.192)  (0.187) 
Oil and gas 
(2000-2006)  0.659  0.649  1.476  0.653  1.517  0.793  0.831  1.747  0.773  1.767 
  (1.394)  (1.293)  (1.538)  (1.497)  (1.632)  (1.294)  (1.239)  (1.492)  (1.400)  (1.566) 
Democracy 
(2000-2006)  -0.057  -0.057  -0.049  -0.057  -0.048  -0.073  -0.075  -0.063  -0.073  -0.063 
  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.056) 
Dummy 
Northern 
Caucasus  -0.915  -0.893  -1.386  -0.915  -1.388  -1.260  -1.193  -1.738  -1.259  -1.737 
  (0.848)  (0.894)  (0.959)  (0.852)  (0.970)  (1.054)  (1.134)  (1.240)  (1.051)  (1.243) 
Contradicting 
acts    -4.675  -4.656    -4.720    -5.675  -5.888    -5.914 
    (3.896)  (4.036)    (4.003)    (4.196)  (4.518)    (4.462) 
Declarations      -1.028    -1.025      -1.232    -1.231 
      (0.702)    (0.706)      (0.898)    (0.898) 
Power  of 
governors        0.005  -0.035        0.017  -0.019 
        (0.403)  (0.394)        (0.486)  (0.487) 
Constant  -0.263  0.236  3.26  -0.294  3.484           
  (1.554)  (1.464)  (2.509)  (2.784)  (3.363)           
Observations  84  84  84  84  84  84  84  84  84  84 
R
2  0.096  0.111  0.135  0.096  0.135           
Pseudo R
2            0.043  0.052  0.062  0.043  0.062 
LR  propor-
tional  odds 
test            31.96  68.45***  75.95***  32.57  76.76*** 
J.-B. test  1.113  2.157  2.295  1.113  2.316           
Notes: see Table 1 Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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Table 3: Personnel appointment for Federal Security Service, dep.var.: difference in regional bias index 




























republic  -0.206  -0.202  -0.124  -0.206  -0.129  -0.539  -0.361  -0.221  -0.593  -0.270 
  (0.411)  (0.443)  (0.528)  (0.419)  (0.527)  (0.803)  (0.857)  (1.083)  (0.844)  (1.092) 
Dummy 
border region  0.338  0.339  0.330  0.393  0.379  0.677  0.737  0.719  0.886  0.917 
  (0.233)  (0.236)  (0.247)  (0.239)  (0.251)  (0.608)  (0.619)  (0.656)  (0.588)  (0.629) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.046  0.047  0.050  0.027  0.028  -0.006  0.015  0.021  -0.058  -0.031 
  (0.041)  (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.120)  (0.103)  (0.112)  (0.116)  (0.110) 
Share  of 
Russians  1.045  1.044  0.972  1.303  1.226  1.618  1.579  1.432  2.48  2.242 
  (0.874)  (0.882)  (0.941)  (0.877)  (0.938)  (1.916)  (1.959)  (2.098)  (1.905)  (2.016) 
Territory  -0.734***  -0.734***  -0.738***  -0.796***  -0.802***  -1.324**  -1.379**  -1.378**  -1.797***  -1.847*** 
  (0.210)  (0.211)  (0.214)  (0.227)  (0.230)  (0.559)  (0.546)  (0.545)  (0.669)  (0.646) 
Population 
(2000-2006)  -0.018  -0.018  -0.017  -0.040  -0.039  -0.084  -0.085  -0.082  -0.160  -0.154 
  (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.071)  (0.151)  (0.150)  (0.146)  (0.160)  (0.153) 
Oil and gas 
(2000-2006)  1.987***  1.987***  2.068***  1.671***  1.761**  4.028***  4.125***  4.264**  3.458**  3.758** 
  (0.578)  (0.581)  (0.671)  (0.613)  (0.706)  (1.500)  (1.466)  (1.736)  (1.473)  (1.699) 
Democracy 
(2000-2006)  -0.008  -0.008  -0.007  -0.016  -0.015  -0.018  -0.018  -0.017  -0.044  -0.042 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.050)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.055) 
Dummy 
Northern 
Caucasus  0.825*  0.826*  0.779*  0.857*  0.796*  1.665*  1.708*  1.617*  1.817*  1.729* 
  (0.439)  (0.439)  (0.448)  (0.445)  (0.442)  (0.907)  (0.927)  (0.916)  (0.992)  (0.938) 
Contradicting 
acts    -0.081  -0.090    0.351    -3.853  -3.853    -3.037 
    (2.521)  (2.560)    (2.622)    (5.380)  (5.395)    (5.205) 
Declarations      -0.100    -0.122      -0.186    -0.254 
      (0.374)    (0.384)      (0.854)    (0.909) 
Power  of 
governors        0.259  0.265        0.836  0.824 
        (0.189)  (0.201)        (0.536)  (0.554) 
Constant  -1.113  -1.106  -0.816  -2.816*  -2.528           
  (0.966)  (1.016)  (1.536)  (1.599)  (2.093)           
Observations  83  83  83  83  83  83  83  83  83  83 
R
2  0.200  0.200  0.200  0.216  0.217           
Pseudo R
2            0.088  0.091  0.092  0.106  0.109 
LR  propor-
tional  odds 
test            74.18***  76.47***  77.87***  77.25***  80.25*** 
J.-B. test  19.99***  20.02***  19.67***  16.97***  16.35***           
Notes: see Table 1. According to the Jarque-Bera test, there are following outliers in all regressions: Evreiskaia, 
Aginsk Buriat, Chukotka, Khanty Mansi, Nenets, Moscow (City), St. Petersburg, Altai Krai, Krasnoiarsk, Pri-
morski, Stavropol, Amur, Arkhangelsk, Briansk, Cheliabinsk, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kamchatka, Kemerovo, Kirov, 
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Penza, Perm, Riazan, Samara, Sverdlovskaia, Tambov, Tomsk, Tula, Tver, Ulianovsk, Vladimir, Vologda, Vo-
ronezh, Yaroslavl, Alrai Rep., Bashkortostan, Buriatia, Chuvashia, Kalmykia, Karelia, Khakassia, Komi, Mariy 
El, Mordovia, Tatarstan, Tyva, Udmurtia. There are following exceptions: in regression (23) Kemerovo is not an 
outlier, in regression (24) Krasnodar, Novosibirsk, Pskov, Sakhalin, Volgograd, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, 
Sakha are outliers and Stavropol and Orel not, in regression (25) Krasnodar, Novosibirsk, Pskov, Volgograd, 
Dagestan are outliers and Stavropol, Tomsk  and Orel not. After exclusion of outliers, dummy Northern Cauca-
sus in regression (21), (22), (23), (25) becomes insignificant, but still has a positive coefficient. 
4.2  Prosecutor’s Office  
Table 2 reports the baseline estimations for the Prosecutor’s Office. One does not find 
any significant impact of the public claims or the real policies variables on the appointment 
decisions. Regarding the bargaining power variables, for the Prosecutor’s Office I find only 
evidence of cautious policies with respect to regions with large population. There seems to be 
no need to re-estimate OLS regressions, since the normal distribution of residuals cannot be 
rejected. However, for the logit regressions proportional odds assumption cannot be sustained. 
Re-estimations through ordered logit (where I use marginal effects at the mean for inference) 
do not support the finding: population is mostly insignificant, but positive, and other variables 
do not show any robust effects on the appointments.
14 
Including initial regional bias in the regressions (Appendix B, Table B2) does generate 
a number of interesting changes. First, now I find a negative and significant impact of the 
number of contradicting acts on the re-appointment policies; declarations remain insignificant. 
Hence, inclusion of initial regional bias as a covariate suggests, that in case of the Ministry of 
Interior the “words” were more important than “deeds” (and supported more cautious attitude 
of the federal government towards strong regions), while for the Prosecutor’s Office “deeds” 
and not “words” mattered (and supported more aggressive behavior towards strong regions). 
To start with, the federal government seems to treat the “words” and “deeds” differently not 
only by changing its appointment policies for different agencies, but also changing the direc-
tion of the re-appoinmtnents. The relation between aggressive and cautious behavior and im-
portance of public claims and policies is not completely clear: one could probably expect the 
federal government to consider it more difficult and risky to intervene in the area of public 
politics, than to strongly restrict the informal devolution often not perceived by the population 
– but, on the other hand, regional governments could consider the real benefits as more valu-
able, as the opportunity to make public statements (especially in the Russian political culture, 
which still exhibits strong traits of the Soviet “closed bargaining style”) – and then would 
fight for the former rather than for the latter. However, the result may indicate that both pref-
erences regarding the public claims and real policies may matter; the federal government may 
simply manipulate its policies for different agencies, probably treating them as partial substi-
tutes (indeed, Prosecutors have a strong influence on the activity of police and vice versa).  
Moreover, I find that democracy is significant and negative – and hence, the federal 
government was active in appointing prosecutors with lower “embeddedness” in local context 
in the regions where democracy level was high. It makes sense since Prosecutors are directly 
involved  in  monitoring  of  “politically  sensitive  issues”  (for  example,  related  to  election 
                                                 
14 Generalized ordered logit regressions in this paper are not reported in this paper, but can be provided on re-
quest. Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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fraud), and therefore may be relevant in this context. Once again, the result is not robust in 
generalized ordered logit estimations. Table B2 yields a number of further interesting observa-
tions, consistent with mixed cautious and aggressive behavior towards strong regions: dis-
tance from Moscow and oil and gas become partly positive and significant (cautious policy 
towards strong regions) and territory is partly negative and significant (aggressive policy to-
wards strong regions). One should be aware though that the results of the Table B2 do not 
survive the generalized ordered logit estimations, where neither “words” nor “deeds” are sig-
nificant, and other results are not robust. Since in this particular regression proportional-odds 
assumption could not be sustained, the results for the Prosecutor’s Offices should be treated 
with extreme caution. 
 
4.3  Federal Security Service 
The estimations for the Federal Security Service seem to be less interesting for our 
discussion, as it could have been expected (since the capture problem and subsequent reform 
were probably not so important for this agency). Basically, I cannot find any significant effect 
of “words” or “deeds” on appointment decisions in any specification or with any estimation 
technique. The results for the baseline estimation are reported in Table 3. In once again con-
firms that the overall “centralizing” trend in the appointment policy of the Russian govern-
ment in the 2000s becomes at least ambiguous: it looks like federal administration (at least, 
partly) focused on relatively weak regions, while strong regions were even able to get more 
control over “their” local security agencies. For the FSB appointments federal government 
was “aggressive” vis-à-vis regions with large territory and “cautious” against oil and gas re-
gions.
15  It is worth noticing that the sign for oil and gas is reverse for the Ministry of Interior 
and for the FSB, probably still suggesting the opportunity of “hostage exchange” for these 
agencies: “local” FSB head as price for the “federal” Minister of Interior.  
The LR test for ordered logit regressions also rejects the proportional-odds assump-
tion; therefore the application of generalized ordered logit becomes necessary; the results ob-
tained, however, do not survive if one considers marginal effects at the mean in this estima-
tion approach. Including the regional bias in 2000 changes the results slightly: in the new 
specification dummy republic is negative and significant in ordered logit, population is posi-
tive and significant in OLS (but not robust to exclusion of outliers) and oil and gas loses its 
significance in OLS (Appendix B, Table B3). New results seem to be not robust to estimation 
technique, and, moreover, once again provide mixed evidence about the behavior of the cen-
tral  government  –  both  aggressive  (dummy  republic)  and  cautious  (population)  towards 
stronger regions. However, no results of ordered logit could be confirmed in generalized or-
dered logit (with the exception of the negative effect of regional bias in 2000). 
                                                 
15 Moreover, dummy Northern Caucasus is once again almost always significant. This result is however not 
robust to outliers and do not survive the  inclusion of the initial regional bias – so, evidence of “ruling through 
local elites” is much weaker than in case of the Ministry of Interior. It is surprising though that one finds any 
evidence at all, since in Russia traditionally the Federal Security Service, as well as its infamous predecessor 
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4.4  Preliminary conclusions 
Summarizing the findings for “words” and “deeds”, the situation looks as follows. 
First, the importance of public claims for appointments in the Ministry of Interior is con-
firmed almost regardless of specification and estimation technique, and one can indeed claim 
that for police the federal government paid more attention to what the regional governors said 
than to their de-facto policies. Second, the results for Prosecutor’s Office are much less ro-
bust: the “deeds” variable is significant in some specifications, does this result is strongly in-
fluenced by the set of covariates and does not appear in the generalized ordered logit, which is 
required in this case because of the proportional-odds assumption. Finally, for the Federal 
Security Service no significant results for “words” and “deeds” were established. For all vari-
ables I find combined cautious and aggressive approaches towards regions with stronger bar-
gaining power by appointing new governors; however, results for individual variables are 
often not robust to the specification and estimation technique (with Ministry of Interior, once 
again, providing relatively more robust evidence). Finally, federal government always focused 
its attention on regions with larger regional bias – which, however, are not necessarily those 
with strong bargaining power.
16 
 
5  Extensions and robustness checks 
5.1  Initial level of regional bias 
   As I have shown so far, federal government is clearly attempting to reduce the re-
gional bias in the regions with initially strong connections between federal and regional bu-
reaucrats, but is ambiguous about regions with strong bargaining position. However, intui-
tively it seems like these two sets of regions may be overlapping. It is also interesting to un-
derstand how different bargaining factors, as well as “public claims” and “real policies” influ-
enced not just the change of regional bias, but also the level of regional bias. Therefore I have 
estimated regressions where the dependent variable is the level of regional bias in 2000 (Table 
4) and 2007 (Table 5).
17 One can clearly see that in both cases regional bias for different 
agencies is driven by different factors; hence, as in the previous section, I will look at each 
organization. It should moreover be noted that for this type of estimations by the selection of 
                                                 
16 It is clear that so far one questionable assumption I made was that the appointments in all three agencies are 
basically independent. In order to check it I estimated a system of equations (3), (13) and (23) using three-
stage least squares. In this case all effects, which have been significant in the stand-alone regressions, remain 
significant and hold their sign, with the exception of dummy Northern Caucasus for the FSB, which becomes 
insignificant.  In addition, for the Prosecutor’s Office I find significant and positive impact of dummy North-
ern Caucasus and of the declarations – so, for the 3SLS estimations the relevance of “words” over “deeds” 
seems to be even more pronounced. Results are not reported, but available on request. 
17 One could of course pool these two time periods to a panel – but, as the results of both cross-sectional regres-
sions show, there is likely to be a structural break between these two observations. Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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the data the endogeneity problem is more acute than in the previous part of the paper – and 
therefore the results should be treated with caution.
18 
  For the Ministry of Interior the only robust finding for the pre-Putin era is that border 
regions seem to have higher regional bias. This fact can be explained by several considera-
tions: probably, border regions were more successful at protecting their “capture” of the fed-
eral agencies, but probably their remote position made it more difficult for the federal gov-
ernment to find replacements for the positions of bureaucrats (which have been quite unpopu-
lar before Putin’s accession to power) – although distance from Moscow is insignificant. An-
yway, strong regions seem to have higher regional bias.
19 Under Putin, however, the situation 
changed completely: dummy republic (as well as distance from Moscow and oil and gas in 
OLS) has been negatively associated with the regional bias – therefore strong regions had 
worse possibilities to establish control over agencies of the federal government.  
                                                 
18 In what follows I will refer to the regressions where the dependent variable is the change of the regional bias 
as “re-appointment regressions”, and to the regressions where the dependent variable is the regional bias of a 
particular year as “regional bias 2000 / 2007” regressions. 
19 It should be further noted that for all agencies the Northern Caucasus dummy is always significant (although 
partly not robust to outliers) in the Yeltsin period – however, the sign is positive for the Prosecutor’s Office 
and negative for both other agencies. For the Putin period no robust results were established. From this point 
of view the observed significant impact of the Northern Caucasus dummy for re-appointments in the Ministry 
of Interior and the FSB seems to be even more convincing and simply represents the shift from focusing on 
“federal representatives” in the region of major concern to using local elites in a kind of “indirect rule” struc-
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Table 4: Determinants of personnel appointments in 2000, dep.var.: regional bias for three federal agen-
cies in 2000 













Dependent  variable: 









FSB  Prosecutor’s 
Office 
Dummy republic  0.298  -0.410  -0.650  0.956  -0.932  -0.967 
  (0.576)  (0.547)  (0.712)  (1.210)  (1.085)  (1.026) 
Dummy border region  0.747***  -0.380  0.164  1.248***  -0.630  0.207 
  (0.232)  (0.272)  (0.331)  (0.480)  (0.600)  (0.512) 
Distance from Moscow  -0.012  -0.005  0.016  0.025  0.011  0.036 
  (0.049)  (0.054)  (0.071)  (0.083)  (0.123)  (0.111) 
Share of Russians  -0.391  -1.047  1.711  -0.744  -1.350  3.465* 
  (0.746)  (1.079)  (1.113)  (1.190)  (2.665)  (1.941) 
Territory  -0.361  0.325  -0.006  -0.708  0.535  -0.011 
  (0.418)  (0.319)  (0.428)  (0.642)  (0.558)  (0.584) 
Population 
(1995-1999)  0.112**  0.302***  0.009  0.277  0.571**  0.016 
  (0.056)  (0.094)  (0.131)  (0.203)  (0.231)  (0.188) 
Oil and gas 
(1995-1999)  0.395  -1.778*  1.496  1.271  -3.439  16.016 
  (1.118)  (0.957)  (0.936)  (2.436)  (2.375)  (24.312) 
Democracy  
(1995-1999)  -0.032  -0.003  -0.010  -0.082*  -0.025  -0.023 
  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.033)  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.046) 
Dummy  Northern 
Caucasus  -1.218**  -0.792*  1.801***  -2.287**  -36.363***  3.638** 
  (0.525)  (0.462)  (0.559)  (1.079)  (1.113)  (1.628) 
Contradicting acts  -2.417  -0.400  -2.270  -7.229  -1.567  -3.123 
  (2.645)  (3.705)  (3.456)  (5.430)  (7.784)  (4.691) 
Declarations  0.137  0.409  1.320***  0.338  0.984  2.186*** 
  (0.377)  (0.373)  (0.444)  (0.745)  (0.997)  (0.823) 
Constant  2.928**  0.317  -2.902*       
  (1.345)  (1.581)  (1.637)       
Observations  88  86  88  88  86  88 
R
2  0.186  0.228  0.134       
Pseudo R
2        0.095  0.147  0.101 
LR  proportional  odds 
test        18.23  18.68  13.14 
J.-B. test  11.57***  11.92***  9.97***       
 
Note: see Table 1. List of outliers includes: (31): Evenkia, Khanty Mansi, Nenets, Taimyr, Ust Ordyn Buriat, St 
Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk, Arkhangelsk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kamchatka, Kirov, Lipetsk, Magadan, Nizhniy 
Novgorod, Novgorod, Orenburg, Riazan, Perm, Sverdlovskaya, Tambov, Tomsk, Tula, Tver, Volgograd, Vo-
logda, Yaroslvavl, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Mariy El, Mordovia, Sakha; (32): Aginsk Buriat, Khanty Mansi, 
Krasnodar,  Primoskiy,  Briansk,  Kaluga,  Kemerovo,  Leningradskaya,  Nizhniy  Novgorod,  Penza,  Samara, 
Smolensk, Tambov, Ulianovsk, Voronezh, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Tyva, Udmurtia; (33): Evreiskaya, Nenets, 
Taimyr,  Moscow  (City),  Chita,  Kaliningrad,  Murmansk,  Orel,  Voronezh,  Saratov,  Ulianovsk,  Karachevo-
Chekressia, Buriatia, Mariy El. There are no changes after exclusion of outliers in all regression, with the excep-
tion of Northern Caucasus dummy in regression (32), which becomes insignificant (although maintains its sign).  Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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Table 5: Determinants of personnel appointments in 2007, dep.var.: regional bias for three federal agen-
cies in 2007 

























FSB  Prosecutor’s 
Office 
Dummy republic  -2.649***  -1.024**  0.433  -5.837***  -43.581***  0.691 
  (0.491)  (0.485)  (0.689)  (1.826)  (3.409)  (1.193) 
Dummy  border 
region  -0.223  -0.134  -0.259  -0.451  -0.318  -0.489 
  (0.314)  (0.254)  (0.326)  (0.612)  (0.845)  (0.548) 
Distance  from 
Moscow  -0.083  0.030  0.154**  -0.184  0.188  0.270** 
  (0.055)  (0.042)  (0.071)  (0.154)  (0.183)  (0.12) 
Share of Russians   -2.011*  -0.710  1.075  -4.740**  -0.822  1.556 
  (1.088)  (0.877)  (1.212)  (1.903)  (2.848)  (1.801) 
Territory  0.196  -0.328  -0.511**  0.281  -6.632***  -1.203 
  (0.434)  (0.198)  (0.209)  (0.666)  (2.495)  (0.921) 
Population 
(2000-2006)  0.082  0.227***  0.255***  0.089  0.837**  0.452** 
  (0.087)  (0.080)  (0.087)  (0.145)  (0.362)  (0.202) 
Oil and gas 
(2000-2006)  -4.302***  -0.235  2.520*  -37.302  6.260  4.402** 
  (1.306)  (0.939)  (1.437)  (41.322)  (4.310)  (2.196) 
Democracy 
(2000-2006)  -0.007  -0.009  -0.061**  0.001  -0.102  -0.106* 
  (0.030)  (0.021)  (0.030)  (0.055)  (0.073)  (0.059) 
Dummy  Northern 
Caucasus  0.918  -0.145  0.335  1.548  -34.554***  0.542 
  (0.694)  (0.300)  (0.793)  (1.065)  (1.419)  (1.241) 
Contradicting acts  2.124  0.594  -6.939**  4.352  -0.895  -11.839* 
  (2.714)  (2.152)  (3.041)  (5.309)  (5.544)  (6.113) 
Declarations  1.598***  0.384  0.384  3.562***  3.838*  0.580 
  (0.507)  (0.310)  (0.521)  (1.352)  (2.111)  (0.866) 
Constant  -1.222  -0.018  0.836       
  (1.899)  (1.306)  (2.039)       
Observations  79  83  84  79  83  84 
R
2  0.264  0.213  0.192       
Pseudo R
2        0.196  0.315  0.124 
LR  proportional 
odds test        15.95  8.46  20.78 
J.-B. test  6.623**  57.870***  7.167**       
 
Note:  see  Table  1.  In  OLS  regressions  the  outliers  are  the  following:  (37):  Khabarovsk,  Briansk,    Lenin-
gradskaya,  Novgorod,  Novosibirsk,  Riazan,  Sverdlovskaia,  Tomsk,  (38):  Aginsk  Buriat,  Chukotka,  Khanty-
Mansi, Nenets, St. Petersburg, Altai (Krai), Krasnodar, Primorski, Cheliabinsk, Kemerovo, Moscow Region, 
Murmansk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Penza, Perm, Rostov, Samara, Smolensk, Sverdlovskaya, Voronezh, Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan; (39): Arkhangelsk, Leningradskaya, Novosibirsk, Bashkortostan. After the exclusion of outliers 
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From this point of view Putin’s intention to break the ties between regional admini-
strations and federal officials seemed to succeed – however, regions with higher share of Rus-
sian population (i.e. with weaker bargaining position) at the same time had lower regional 
bias. This is an interesting result, especially if one takes into account that large share of ethnic 
Russians was also associated with larger retention rates (Libman and Feld, 2009); it seems 
like federal government granted higher autonomy to potentially weaker regions without large 
non-Russian minorities. Finally, declarations are significant and positive, explaining the effect 
observed in the previous part of the paper. 
  For the FSB the results have been ambiguous under Yeltsin (year 2000): population is 
significant with a positive sign, while oil and gas has a significant negative impact (but only 
in OLS, which may be misspecified in this case). The significant and positive impact of popu-
lation on the regional bias remained also under Putin. So, it looks like large regions in terms 
of their population are more likely to receive “locals” as heads of the Federal Security Service 
branches. It can however simply represent the fact that in a large population it is easier to re-
cruit high-qualified bureaucrats without moving them from other regions. Under Putin popu-
lation remains significant and positive, but there is also a negative impact of dummy republic, 
which is not robust to outliers in OLS. There is also significant and positive impact of decla-
rations, but only in ordered logit (and only at 10% significance level).
20  
  For the Prosecutor’s Office the only significant and robust (in OLS and ordered logit) 
effect for the Yeltsin period  (with the exception of the dummy Northern Caucasus) is the 
positive sign of the declarations, suggesting that the regions with strong public claims specifi-
cally focused on establishing control over the Prosecutor’s Office. Under Putin, however, one 
can  establish  several  interesting  observations.  First,  once  again,  the  impact  of  bargaining 
power variables is mixed: while distance from Moscow and population are significant and 
positive, territory is significant and negative (only in OLS). What is more interesting is that 
democracy is significant and negative: therefore, once again, there is evidence that “external” 
prosecutors were appointed in the “more democratic” regions in Russia and that the office of 
the regional prosecutor may have been an important factor for the spread of the authoritarian-
ism under Putin in the 2000s. Moreover, I find a significant and negative impact of the share 
of contradicting acts passed under Yeltsin – probably explaining the mixed evidence from the 
Tables 2 and B2. This outcome shows that for the appointment of regional prosecutors the 
federal government indeed took the desire to reduce the de-facto autonomy achieved by the 
regions into account.
21  
                                                 
20 One should note however that in both 2000 and 2007 the ordered logit specifications for the FSB face the 
problem of perfect prediction caused by the inclusion of the dummies republic and Northern Caucasus – for 
example, in 2007 all republics had a 0 score for the regional bias for the FSB. Hence, interpretation of the or-
dered logit results is questionable: simply excluding offending variables in this case is very likely to result in a 
omitted variable bias, since all mentioned variables are from the point of view of what we know of Russian 
specifics highly relevant, and makes almost all results unstable (with the exception of population, which re-
mains significant both for 2000 and 2007). 
21 For 2007 perfect prediction problem also occurs for ordered logit: removing offending variables (dummy bor-
der region, republic and Northern Caucasus) makes all remaining regressors insignificant.  Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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  To conclude, the regressions basically confirm the outcomes of the previous sections: 
first, bargaining power variables can have both negative and positive effects on the regional 
bias, and second, I find impact of public claims on the regional bias for the Ministry of Inte-
rior (in 2007) and the Prosecutor’s Office (in 2000) and of the contradicting acts for the Pros-
ecutor’s Office (in 2007) – so, in this case both “words” and “deeds” seem to matter for the 
re-appointment policies, but for different agencies.
22 It should be noted though that as I will 
show in what follows, the results for both regressions on the regional bias level are much less 
robust as for the regressions on the change of the regional bias, if one varies the set of out-
liers, and hence a more cautious interpretation is required. The discussion in what follows will 
confirm this claim. Caution is often called for because of the perfect prediction problem, 
which did not occur in the re-appointment regressions (both with and without initial regional 
bias), but, as discussed, did happen in the regional bias specifications. So, in purely statistical 
sense the reliability of these results is not unequivocal. 
 
5.2  Crime rates and appointment policies 
  The regressions so far ignored at least one variable, which may become quite impor-
tant in the context of appointment policies of the federal government for security agencies – 
the crime rates. It is possible to expect the federal government to intervene not only because 
of the power contest with regional elites, but simply to provide the public good of security 
and order. What is less straightforward is why these interventions should result in reduction or 
increase of “regional bias”, but it is at least theoretically possible that, for example, the federal 
government links the regional connections of heads of its agencies to their ability to fight 
crime in the particular region, while making the appointment decisions (and that this link 
could actually exist). The most obvious approach were to include some indicator of crime 
rates in the regressions – however, this variable is, first, highly endogenous, and second, like-
ly to be manipulated in the context of appointments (reporting lower – or reducing – crime 
rates could support the carrier of the heads of regional police or prosecutors). However, in 
order to check for the robustness of my results, I re-estimated all regressions reported so far 
including crime rates (average number of crimes committed in 2000-2006 per 100,000 inhabi-
tants of the region).
23 
                                                 
22 For these specifications, once again, I estimated systems of equations: first two separate systems of (31), (32) 
and (33) and (37), (38) and (39), and then a system of all six equations (which would imply that the re-
appointments made in 2007 are somehow related to what happened before 2000) using 3SLS. First look at two 
systems of equations. In 2007 for the Ministry of Interior no results change; for the FSB all results of stand-
alone regressions are confirmed, but also dummy republic is significant and negative; for the Prosecutor’s Of-
fice territory and oil and gas lose significance, but there are no further changes. In 2000 for the Ministry of In-
terior population, for the FSB dummy Northern Caucasus and oil and gas loses significance, and there are no 
further changes, as there are no changes for the Prosecutor’s Office. For the system of six equations we basi-
cally find the same as for two systems, with the exception of dummy republic for the FSB in 2000, which is 
once again insignificant, and for the FSB dummy border region in 2000 becomes significant and positive. To 
conclude, all results for words and deeds survive, as well as the “mixed” evidence for the combination of cau-
tious and aggressive strategies. 
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  To start with, regardless of the specification (and also regardless of including the ini-
tial level of regional bias or not) in the regressions for the change of the level of the regional 
bias, crime rates are insignificant for the FSB re-appointments. It is to be expected, because 
the function of this agency is not to combat the ordinary crime, but rather to care for issues 
like espionage. What is more interesting is that crime rates have no influence on the re-
appointments in the Ministry of Interior, which primarily focus is exactly to combat criminal 
activity. For the prosecutor’s office crime rates are almost always significant and negative for 
the re-appointment decisions. This result suggests that the federal government used the ap-
pointments of administrators without regional connections also to reduce crime. Including the 
initial level of the regional bias does not change the results, and I also do not find any impact 
of controlling for the crime rates on the “words” and the “deeds” – so, the main message of 
this paper does not seem to be influenced by the problem described. 
For the regressions for the actual level of the regional bias in 2000 crime rates are not 
significant and almost never influence the sign and significance of other variables, including 
the declarations for the Prosecutor’s Office. Looking at the regional bias in 2007 one finds the 
negative association between the crime rates and the regional bias for the prosecutors – so, 
locally embedded prosecutors seem to be less efficient in combating crime (the reasons for 
that may vary from bureaucratic inertia to corruption), - but no other significant results. How-
ever, it is important to notice that the results for crime rates simply suggest the (partial) corre-
lation, and not the causality of the link, and may be biased because of the endogeneity prob-
lem. The share of contradicting acts for the Prosecutor’s Office is still significant and nega-
tive, but the declarations are now always significant and positive for all agencies and specifi-
cations (in ordered logit – in the OLS it is still only the Ministry of the Interior).  
 
5.3  Interaction between words and deeds 
  So far I have assumed that the effects of actions and of policy choices (i.e., declara-
tions made by regional elites and contradicting acts) do not interact with each other. However, 
it is highly plausible to assume that the reaction of the federal government on claims is some-
how dependent on actions implemented by the regions and vice versa. Hence, to solve this 
problem I have included the interaction term between words and deeds (i.e. product of both 
variables) in the regressions of the Table 1-3.
24 Generally speaking, the result is straightfor-
ward: neither sign nor significance of words and deeds as such change in any manner, while 
the interaction term is insignificant. It may indicate that the federal government simply treats 
two aspects of the problem as clearly separated from each other, and therefore does not condi-
tion its responses (since the size of the coefficient of the contradicting acts in regressions (2) 
and (3) (and (7) and (8) respectively) is almost the same, this conclusion seems to be reason-
able).  
However, the really interesting point while introducing interaction is to look at how 
the sign and the significance of the effect changes over the sample. Figure 4 summarizes the 
                                                 
24 The regressions are not reported in this paper, but are available on request Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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marginal effect of declarations on re-appointment for the Ministry of Interior.
25 One can see 
that the effect is in fact significant and positive for small share of contradicting acts, while it 
is insignificant for large shares. In fact, one can claim that my results so far were mostly de-
termined by the fact that the federal government through re-appointments increased the region 
bias for jurisdictions where the share of contradicting acts was anyway low. So, it looks like if 
“deeds” were friendly enough, Putin did not discourage the verbal aggression of the regional 
leaders  by  the  re-appointments.  But  when  the  degree  of  actual  devolution  became  strong 









Figure 4: Marginal effect of the declarations conditional on the share of contradicting acts on 
the re-appointment decision for the Ministry of Interior 
 
In the next stage I also added the interaction terms to the regressions for the actual level of 
regional bias in 2000 and 2007 and looked at how their presence influences the determinants 
of the initial regional bias. Here I indeed observe several changes in the results. First, for the 
regression of regional bias in the year 2000 declarations are now not significant for Prosecu-
tor’s Office. However, for the Ministry of Interior I find significant and negative effect of the 
contradicting acts on the bias level, and the interaction term is positive and significant (in both 
OLS and ordered logit). Looking at the shifts of the significance bounds across the sample, 
one actually is forced to conclude that the effect is almost always not significant (Figure 5). 
For the year 2007 neither the interaction terms, nor “deeds” are significant; declara-
tions are significant and positive, as it has been the case without the interaction terms. From 
that point of view, the results of the Tables 4 and 5 discussed above do not seem to be robust 
enough; but the major findings for the re-appointments, i.e. the change of the regional bias, 
did not experience any changes (although could be interpreted in a slightly different way). 
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Figure 5: Marginal effect of share of contradicting acts conditional on the level of declara-
tions on the level of the regional bias in the Ministry of Interior, 2000 
 
  Another possible form of interactions it might be interesting to explore is that between 
power and declarations. It is well imaginable that the federal government pays more attention 
to claims made by powerful regions, than just to claims in general. Unfortunately, as it has 
been shown above, we do not have a clear measure of “power”: hence, I have estimated re-
appointment regressions from Tables 1-3 interacting declarations each time with a different 
power variable: dummy republic, dummy  border region, distance from  Moscow, share of 
Russians, territory, population and oil and gas (hence, regressions were re-estimated seven 
times). I have re-estimated specifications with just “words” and “words and deeds” simulta-
neously. In addition, I have introduced an interaction term between power of the governor 
index  and  words  and  re-estimated  a  regression  including  these  two  variables  (as  well  as 
“words” and “words and deeds” as well).
26  
For the police declarations remain significant and positive in almost all specifications 
(regardless of the estimation technique – OLS or ordered logit). Interaction terms are mostly 
not significant, but with the exception of the interaction between declarations and distance 
and declarations and territory, which are significant and negative (while declarations and dis-
tance / territory are often significant and positive). This is an interesting result: it implies that 
while federal government is “cautious” with respect to both “strong” and “publicly active” 
regions, if these two qualities are combined it  becomes much more aggressive in the re-
appointments. So, the federal government does care for whether the “strong” or the “weak” 
region is publicly threatening the central control – if it is weak, it may be “cheaper” to find a 
                                                 
26 The results are not reported here but can be provided on request. Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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compromise  (by  appointing  people  from  this  region),  while  if  it  is  strong,  suppression 
(through appointments of outsiders) becomes more desirable.  
For the FSB declarations are never significant, but the interaction terms are partly 
marginally significant and indicate the same effect: they are negative for the interaction with 
dummy republic and positive for the interaction with share of Russians (which, as indicated, 
while increasing shows a loss of bargaining power). For the Prosecutor’s Office, on the con-
trary, I find a significant and positive effect of the interaction with territory and distance (and 
sometimes a negative and significant effect of the interaction with population). Declarations 
as  such  are  significant  and  negative  only  in  specifications,  where  interaction  terms  with 
distance are included. In this case one could claim to have observed the “opposite” effect: 
being generally speaking more “aggressive” towards regions with strong popular activity, the 
federal government “weakens” its attitude if the region is strong enough (specifically, far 
away from Moscow and hence more difficult to pressure and to control). Since the results are 
not robust, however, a conservative position would be not to “over-interpret” them.  
The  results  of  the  interaction  analysis  for  the  re-appointment  regressions  for  the 
change of the regional bias become somewhat more interesting if one re-estimates the model 
using a binary instead of an ordinal dependent variable: i.e. creating a dummy assigning 1 to 
all cases when the home bias increased and vice versa. In this case one still obtains a signifi-
cant and positive effect of  the declarations (at 1% level), but also a 5% level significant and 
positive effect of the share of contradicting acts and a negative and significant effect of the 
interaction term (I had to drop the dummy Northern Caucasus to avoid perfect prediction 
problem). This result is straightforward: declarations do matter, but their importance goes 
down if the share of violations of the federal law is increasing. 
However, one should be of course aware of the fact that the interaction terms in the 
non-linear models are in many cases not so easy to interpret: simply looking at sign and sig-
nificance of the interaction term does not suffice (see Ai and Norton 2003). I will use the ap-
proach suggested by Norton, Wang and Ai (2004) to correct for the possible misinterpretation 
and look at the significance and the sign of the interaction term for different prediction prob-
abilities. One can see, however, that the marginal effect for low prediction probabilities is 
highly non-robust; for high prediction probabilities it is mostly negative, but, if one looks at 
the z-statistics, only marginally significant (Figures 6 and 7). To conclude, the results fort he 
interaction terms should be interpreted with  extreme caution (though the results could be 
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Figure 6: Marginal effect of the declarations conditional on the share of contradicting acts on 











Figure 7: z-statistics for the Figure 6 
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5.4  “Red Belt” and appointment decisions 
  An additional concern regarding the results of this paper so far is that it ignores the 
differences in the relations between the Yeltsin government and the regional administrations. 
It is possible that in some regions governors were “aligned” to Yeltsin, and hence were able to 
achieve higher de-facto devolution even without any public declarations, while in other re-
gions there were direct hostilities between the regional governors and the presidential office 
of Russia present. To check for this effect I include in the regressions the so-called “red belt” 
dummy, which accounts for the regions where towards the end of 1990s the governors were 
members of the Communist Party (and hence openly hostile to Yeltsin)
27 and re-estimate all 
regression from Tables 1-3 and 4-5.
28 I do not find any changes for other variables through 
including “red belt” in the re-appointment regression of the first three tables, where the de-
pendent variable is the change of the level of the regional bias: “red belt” as such is almost 
never insignificant for all agencies. The results hence show that the re-appointments do not 
take the “old hostilities” between Yeltsin and governors into account. This is particularly in-
teresting, because “red belt” is not correlated with share of contradicting acts and negatively 
correlated with declarations (Communist governors usually liked to represent themselves as 
“protectors of the national unity”, also because of party’s supposed chances to win federal 
elections and gain rents from that). Nevertheless, even including “red belt” and declarations in 
one regression does not ruin the results with respect to declarations. 
However, in the regressions for the level of regional bias in 2000 and 2007 I also find 
no changes in terms of “words” and “deeds”. The red belt dummy is never significant under 
Yeltsin, but is significant and negative for the FSB appointments under Vladimir Putin. This 
is a surprising result: it looks like the presence of a Communist governor (even in the past – 
towards the second term of Vladimir Putin almost all former Communists turned into mem-
bers of the presidential party Edinaya Rossiya) is reason enough for the federal government to 
impose stricter control on the local branches of the Federal Security Service. As I will show in 
what follows, this is not the only piece of evidence suggesting that the “shadows” of the past 
decisions seem to have impact on the politics in the Russian Federations. 
 
5.5  Federal transfers 
  Re-appointment decisions are certainly an important tool of the federal government to 
influence regional political decisions, but of course not the only one: as already mentioned, 
federal government can provide (or withdraw) other benefits, particularly control over attrac-
tive assets and transfers, which can be used in exchange for restricting public declarations or 
                                                 
27 The list is based on CIPKR (2003) and includes Krasnodar, Stavropol, Briansk, Vladimir, Volgograd, Ivanovo, 
Kamchatka, Kursk, Orenburg, Riazan and Tula. It should be noted that there exists an alternative definition of 
the “red belt”, which includes regions with overproportional vote for the Communist Party at federal and re-
gional elections. However, I opt to define the “red belt” by party affiliation of the governor, because it is more 
consistent with the idea that the re-appointments have to combat the de-facto decentralization, and not the 
electoral politics. 
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more cautious relation to passing acts contradicting the federal law. Therefore it seems to be 
reasonable to control for a variable measuring these benefits: a straightforward solution could 
be to include a measure of federal transfers to the regional budget in the regressions. Unfortu-
nately, this variable is also highly endogenous: it is difficult to find out the causal link be-
tween transfers, “words” and “deeds” and reappointment decisions. Nevertheless, I have re-
estimated the regressions of this paper, adding share of federal transfers in the total fiscal ex-
penditures of the region.
29 For the regressions for the change in the regional bias between 
2000 and 2007 and for the actual regional bias in 2007 I used the average share of transfers in 
2000-2006; for the regressions for the regional bias in 2000 the average share for 1995-1999 
was applied (given the availability of data); however, shares of transfers for both periods are 
highly (90.24%) correlated, and therefore this differentiation is unlikely to strongly influence 
the results.  
However, fiscal transfers do not change the results for “words” and “deeds” in any re-
gressions  of  the  Tables  1-5;
30  they  are,  however,  negative  and  significant  just  in  the  re-
appointments for the Federal Security Service. Here, once again, I find evidence of a rather 
“cautious” approach of the federal government, which was more eager to send its emissaries 
in “weak” regions, dependent on the federal center anyway. An alternative interpretation may 
be that the federal government was interested in stricter control over financial flows in these 
particular regions – but in this case it is more plausible to expect the federal government to 
focus on the Prosecutor’s Office than on the FSB, which is (usually) not directly involved in 
the fiscal control process. On the contrary, the finding could also indicate the desire of the 
influential representatives of the FSB (which had an important role in the Putin’s government) 
to place “their” people in regions with large federal fiscal flows to support their rent-seeking 
activities.  
   
5.6  Stability of governors 
  Finally, the paper so far ignored an extremely important dimension, which in fact is 
crucial for the interpretation of the results: I have assumed that the federal government, while 
making re-appointment decisions in the 2000s, deals with the same regional leaders, which 
ruled in the 1990s, and hence, produced both public declarations and de-facto devolution. 
This is certainly not the case, because in many regions governors were replaced during the 
1990s: therefore the differences between “words” and “deeds” can simply represent the dis-
tinction between the past and the current governor, and not some specific preferences of the 
federal government. To check for the impact of this factor, I excluded all regions where gov-
ernor was re-appointed between 1993 (the year after the new constitution granting full power 
to the president after the dissolution of the former Supreme Soviet was passed) and 2000. Un-
fortunately, this measure is imperfect: it is possible, for example, that although the governor 
                                                 
29 The regressions are not reported in this paper, but are available on request 
30 One of the reasons can be that the re-appointments are rather driven by the concerns for the regulatory, and not 
fiscal federalism, as discussed above. On the other hand, it is possible that the share of official transfers simply 
does not measure the “true” benefits provided to the regions, which may be more informal (e.g. privileges by 
privatization) – however, there is no data to corroborate these suggestions. Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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was replaced, his successor was strongly related to him and thus continues his policies, or 
(even more likely) the political regime in the region remains the same, and constant rules 
force different politicians to replicate similar policies. However, for the purpose of a quantita-
tive test looking at regions without governor change (this group includes 33 regions in my 
sample) becomes a viable alternative. In addition, I also looked at the group with governor 
change (i.e. remaining regions) and compared the estimation results in both cases.
 31 
  Generally speaking, replicating regressions from the Tables 1-3 for the group, without 
changes, I still confirm a significant and positive impact of declarations for the Ministry of 
Interior in almost all regression, but there is also a significant and negative impact of the 
“deeds” in all regressions now. When the initial level of the regional bias is included, the first 
result becomes more robust (and is now present in all regressions), while the second survives 
only in orderd logit. For the prosecutors’ re-appointments I now find negative and significant 
impact of the “deeds” even without the initial level. So, at the first glance the results seem to 
be supporting my previous predictions: if one looks just at the “relevant” group of regions 
ruled by the same governors, there is a relatively robust impact of declarations on the re-
appointments in the Ministry of Interior. Impact of “deeds” for this agency is also observed, 
but is not robust to specification.  
  The results become more interesting if one looks at the group where the governor has 
been replaced for the same regressions (Tables 1-3, B1-B2). Here – contrary to any expecta-
tions – I also find a positive and significant impact of declarations, which is highly robust, for 
the Ministry of Interior. There is also some less robust evidence of the negative impact of 
“deeds” even for this agency. For the Prosecutor’s Office neither “words” nor “deeds” are 
now significant. From this point of view the results of this paper seem to be even more sur-
prising: the federal government takes the declarations of the regional elites in the account, 
although the people who made them no longer rule the respective regions. Even more, as the 
Table 5 above shows, declarations were particularly significant for the regional bias in 2007, 
long after the old governors were replaced. From that point of view it looks like politicians 
not just care about public declarations in the devolution process, but include them in their 
decision-making long time after they were made: “words” not just simply matter, but matter 
for a long period of time! 
 
5.7  Alternative measures for the resources  
  A particular disadvantage of the specification I have used so far is that it virtually ig-
nored the impact of other resources than oil and gas on the appointments. However, bargain-
ing power is not necessarily associated with these resources: for example, non-ferrous metals 
in Krasnoyarsk (more specifically, Taimyr) or diamonds in Sakha are also an important factor. 
The problem is that measuring several different types of natural resources at once is a difficult 
task. One can take the share of mining in the regional GRP as a proxy, but in this case one 
may be mismeasuring the really interesting aspect of the bargaining power: for example, if in 
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a small region the share of mining is large, but also region’s GRP is very small, no strong 
bargaining power is to be expected. Nevertheless, I have re-estimated the main regressions 
replacing oil and  gas by  one of the two variables suggested by Vainberg and Rybnikova 
(2006) to capture the resource potential of the region. The first one ranks all regions according 
to their coal, oil, gas and gold deposits. The second estimates the total value of the mineral 
deposits in the region.
 32  
However,  I  do  find  virtually  no  significant  impact  of  these  two  variables  of  re-
appointment or on the appointments in the years 2000 and 2007 (with the exception of few 
specifications). In the re-appointment regressions, there is also almost no change for the sig-
nificance  of  “words”  and  “deeds”  for  the  police.
33  For  the  Prosecutor’s  Office,  however, 
“deeds” become insignificant in the re-appointment decisions, even if controlling for the ini-
tial level of the regional bias (moreover, in the specification without initial regional bias dec-
larations become significant and negative). There are also some minor changes in the regional 
bias regression for the year 2007.
34 Thus, the main message of the paper survives this adjust-
ment.  
 
5.8  Power-sharing treaties and alternative measures of the “deeds” and 
“words” 
  I have already mentioned that a particular problem of the empirical exercise as it has 
been implemented in this paper is to precisely capture the “words” and the “deeds”, i.e. sym-
bolic actions and real redistribution of rents. It is possible that other symbolic actions were in 
fact more important for the behavior of the politicians than the public statements; or that the 
real redistribution of rents was not the implementation of acts contradicting federal law but 
other factors. Certainly, the range of these potential variables is very large to be sure that all 
of them have been captured in any specification; however, in this subsection I intend to ex-
periment with yet another variable of interest – dummy for regions signing a power-sharing 
treaty with the federal government in the 1990s. It is well known that during the Yeltsin pe-
riod regional governments often claimed additional rights not just through unilateral actions, 
but also through bilateral agreements with the federal administration, which have been signed 
by about a half of all jurisdictions. Under Putin most of these acts were abolished by 2002. 
So, it is interesting to know whether power-sharing treaties had any impact on the appoint-
ment policies. 
  Unfortunately, using this variable is not entirely straightforward. To start with, only a 
tiny fraction of all agreements has been reported; many have been signed by individual agen-
cies in the federal and regional governments and are very difficult to trace. Moreover, the con-
tent of agreements differs substantially: while earlier acts (for example, those signed by Tatar-
                                                 
32 The regressions are not reported in this paper, but are available on request. 
33 Declarations become insignificant in specification (5), and remain significant in specifications (3), (B3) and 
(B5), but the significance level goes down 
34 In the regression for 2007 and both groups of natural resources “deeds”, as well as “words” – only in ordered 
logit for the FSB - become insignificant. Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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stan and Bashkortostan) implied relatively high decision-making autonomy, further acts of the 
second half of the 1990s were all very similar to each other, did not grant the regions substan-
tial autonomy and in many cases simply declared federal government’s “recognition” of the 
importance of the region (cf. Obydenkova, 2008). No clear distinction between these two 
groups is possible: so, basically, the existence of a power-sharing treaty may be referred under 
both categories of “words” (recognized claim of the regional government of its relevance) and 
“deeds” (re-distribution of authorities). In this paper I simply added to the set of covariates a 
dummy for all regions, which had a power-sharing agreement with the federal government in 
the early 2000s.
35 
  First, simply adding this dummy does not change any results for the declarations and 
the share of contradicting acts in the re-appointment regressions (with and without regional 
bias), but also has virtually no impact on the appointment regressions in 2000 and 2007 (just 
in specification (41) declarations become insignificant). So, the story used so far seems to 
survive inclusion of this factor. Second, the dummy power sharing as such is significant and 
negative for the Ministry of Interior in the re-appointment regressions of Table 1; this effect 
disappears if one controls for the initial level of the regional bias. For the Federal Security 
Service and the Prosecutor’s Office no influence was established. For the regional bias of the 
year 2000 I was not able to find any significant relation between the power-sharing agree-
ments and the regional bias; in 2007 it has been negative and significant for the Federal Secu-
rity Service in OLS and for the Prosecutor’s Office in OLS and ordered logit. To conclude, 
the results seem to be not robust, and therefore difficult to interpret. Once again, it seems like 
inclusion of this control supports the main claims made in this paper so far.  
 
5.9  Electoral considerations 
  Although Russia is very far from any established democratic standards, yet another 
aspect of “deeds” possibly considered by the federal government could be related to elections. 
Specifically, I am referring to the electoral campaign of 1999. During the last years of the 
Yeltsin’s presidency (i.e. 1998-1999) a group of powerful regional governors formed a coali-
tion aiming to influence the succession procedure and the federal decision-making; this coali-
tion became the basis of the Otechestvo-Vsia Rossiya (OVR, Fatherland – All Russia) block 
headed by the former Prime Yevnegiy Primakov, which demonstrated realistic ambitions to 
become the new president after Yeltsin. On the other hand, yet another group of Russian elites 
(supposedly closer to Boris Yeltsin himself) formed an alternative coalition, which also re-
ceived support of several regional governors (although mostly from weaker regions more de-
pendent from federal transfers), and formed the basis of the MEDVED block (which sup-
ported the alternative successor candidate, Vladimir Putin). Both coalitions competed in the 
parliamentary elections of 1999, which eventually resulted into the MEDVED’s relative suc-
cess, therefore providing power basis for the following Putin’s accession to the presidency. 
The results of the elections in individual regions seem to have been strongly influenced by the 
affiliation of regional governors either for OVR or MEDVED: the most prominent examples 
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are Ingushetia (a North Caucasian republic affiliated with OVR), where OVR received the 
majority of more than 80% of the votes (with MEDVED accounting for about 1%) and Tyva 
(in the Southern Siberia), where OVR obtained about 3% of the votes with more than 70% 
share of MEDVED.  
  Following Putin’s accession to power, MEDVED and OVR merged, providing the 
basis for the current ruling party Edinaya Rossiya. However, OVR seems to have represented 
a very realistic threat to Putin from a group of governors, and hence could have influenced the 
re-appointment considerations. Hence, I have re-estimated the regressions of Tables 1-3 in-
cluding three additional controls: share of the OVR votes in 1999, share of the MEDVED 
votes in 1999, as well as share of the votes for the Communist Party (the traditional opponent 
of the Russian government) in 1999.
36 To start with, the results for the “words” and the Minis-
try of Interior are confirmed: the variable is still significant and positive (regardless of wheth-
er I include in addition the initial regional bias or not). For the FSB still no significant effect 
was found; for the Prosecutor’s Office “deeds” are marginally significant and negative in or-
dered logit even without initial regional bias. So, the results reported survive the additional 
controls.  
As for the significance of these controls as such, the elections do not matter for the 
Ministry of Interior and Prosecutor’s Office reappointment, but have a strong effect on the 
FSB decisions (which is, however, just marginally significant). Surprisingly, all three vari-
ables have a negative and significant sign. Hence, once again, federal government seems to 
“mix” the strategies: re-appointments influence both “loyal” MEDVED regions, as well as 
regions with large Communist’ and OVR share. Thus, this additional finding of combining 
“search for scapegoats” and “restrictions for powerful players” is confirmed for these elec-
toral aspects as well.   
                                                 
36 The regressions are not reported in this paper, but are available on request. Russian elections during this period 
used a mixed system with half of the parliament elected through party lists, and half consisting of representa-
tives of individual geographical districts, so I provide the data just for the half of the parliament elected 
through a proportional system (since in this case partisan preferences are more obvious). In addition, please 
note that through the timing of events reverse causality is impossible: the elections took place in 1999, and the 
re-appointments started in 2000 (and hence could take the results of the elections into consideration). Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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6  Conclusion 
  The aim of this paper was to look at the appointment policies in the territorial divi-
sions of Russian security agencies between 2000 and 2007 in order to understand the relative 
importance of real re-allocation of resources and of “symbolic gestures” of regional govern-
ments. Surprisingly (for the economics point of view), a robust result of the paper is that 
“symbols” play a more important role than “rents” – even in a non-democracy like Russia, 
where electoral concerns play a limited role. In fact, the Russian federal government seems to 
have a particularly “long memory” regarding the declarations of regional elites: they seem to 
matter even after the governors, who made them, are long gone. The last result should be 
treated with caution: it is possible that what I capture are simply declarations after 1995, 
which are correlated with the past declarations (and could theoretically be made even by dif-
ferent governors – but it would require a lot of continuity between regional administrations). 
The paper finds that declarations of regional elites have a significant and robust impact on re-
appointments in the Ministry of Interior. For the Prosecutor’s Office (oversight of other secu-
rity agencies and criminal investigation) I find a more expected evidence of specific focus on 
“deeds” instead of “words”; however, the result is less robust from the point of view of speci-
fication; moreover,  although the variable is always significant, it also changes sign, what 
makes interpretation problematic. Finally, for the Federal Security Service neither “words” 
nor “deeds” seem to matter; however, this agencies seems to be least “captured” in the 1990s 
and hence relatively unaffected by the Putin’s reforms.  
  This result is interesting from several points of view. First, it provides some evidence 
that in the devolution and secession conflicts parties pay even greater attention to the sym-
bolic gestures of their opponents than to the real distribution of rents. It may driven by the 
preferences and ego-rents, or by the feat of the “contagion” of the secession and decentraliza-
tion and its influence on the perception of third parties. Hence, concentration on redistribu-
tional consequences of devolution is insufficient to explain the patterns of decentralization 
and their divergence in different countries: it may be even more important to look at how the 
devolution process is framed in a particular situation. Moreover, since it is often more diffi-
cult to find a compromise for “symbols” than for the rents, the importance of the declarations 
is relevant to understand the difficulty of the devolution conflicts. In this case introducing 
transfers between regions (what is probably the standard attempt in economics to make a 
mechanism incentive-compatible) does not solve the problem of the conflicts over decentrali-
zation: the key issue may be to find common ground for the symbolic gestures.  
  In addition, as mentioned the results may have a more general meaning outside the 
analysis of devolution, and contribute to the understanding of the role of non-credible threats 
in bargaining. A claim which probably most political economists will share is that in negotia-
tions arguments of parties matter only if they are credible. If a threat of a participant in nego-
tiations is certainly non-credible (for example, because information on her endowment or oth-
er actions is available), one would hardly expect her opponents to react on that (Houba and 
Bolt, 2002).
37 It is however quite difficult to relate this findings to the real world behavior, 
                                                 
37 However, in the laboratory settings it has been shown that cheap talk can effectively influence the behavior of 
the parties even if the verbal threat cannot be verified and that lies about private information can influence 
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simply because in the non-experimental situations the knowledge of the “rules of the game” 
played in a particular situation is highly imperfect. Stated otherwise, any supposedly “non-
credible” threat influencing political behavior in bargaining situations could simply represent 
extreme loss aversion of the bargaining partners, which intend to avoid even the smallest pos-
sible risk. In order to properly test the relevance of non-credible threats in a non-experimental 
setting it would probably be nice to have a case when both threats and realizations of behavior 
of the bargaining party are observed to the other party: this is exactly the case in the setting of 
this paper, if declarations of elites are interpreted as threats and the share of contradicting acts 
as realization of these threats. In 2000 the presidential administration could immediately as-
sess the credibility of these threats made in the first half of the 1990s simply observing the 
subsequent behavior of regional governors.
38 
  In this case one could say that the paper shows not just the importance of claims made 
by political agents in negotiations, but that even if they are non-credible (i.e. declarations of 
the elites are not followed by real devolution decisions) they still matter for the parties – be-
cause, as discussed, they may have preferences over the content of communication, and not 
just over actions of players. Since time-inconsistency belongs to the main explanations of 
suboptimality of economic decision-making in the current literature (Dixit and Romer, 2006), 
this modification becomes particularly important: if agents “like” and “dislike” what politi-
cians  “promise  to  them”  per  se  (regardless  of  what  is  actually  done),  making  a  time-
inconsistent claim may be still relevant for politics. However, this interpretation of the results 
of this paper probably assumes “too much”, especially because, as I mentioned, the findings 
are present not just in the subsample of regions ruled by the same governors (as it would be 
expected), but also when the governors who made the declarations in the first half of the 
1990s were often replaced during the subsequent years. Moreover, it is difficult to clearly 
justify the link between declarations and policies: the former could have resulted in other ac-
tions than simply re-arrangements of the regional legislation (for example, by providing ac-
cess to federal subsidies and grants), and then there is no clear reason to believe that the share 
of contradicting acts indeed captures all the realizations of a threat. Nevertheless, the impor-
tance of “words” over “deeds” still remains an interesting finding.
39 
                                                                                                                                                         
suggest absent effect of cheap talk (Forsyth et al., 1991). In other social sciences social constructivists argue 
that the actions of participants in negotiations may in fact be driven by the conformity to the permanently 
changing social norms, which could make even non-credible threats relevant for negotiations (Risse, 2000). 
38 Which, as already mentioned, has also been known to the federal administration by the definition of the re-
spective variable – based on the reports of the Ministry of Justice. 
39 It should be noted that so far interpreting the results of my paper I avoided using the term “reputation” to de-
scribe either “words” or “deeds”. Reputation is a central concept for the discussion of non-credible claims, and 
of course the decisions discussed are related to reputation formation (which can also explain this long-lasting 
“institutional memory”). However, reputation obviously relates to both claims and actions of the agents: the 
advantage of this paper is not just that we look at the political reactions on the decisions of the opponents in 
the past (and therefore show whether the politicians “remember” what happened then), but we also disentangle 
“reputations” based on just public claims and on just observable actions – what is, in my opinion, an interest-
ing exercise. 
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From this perspective the paper is also related to the empirical literature on the credi-
bility of political commitments, for example, in the electoral competition (see Elinder et al., 
2008, p. 12, for a survey). However, unlike these studies, I am not interested in whether prom-
ises are fulfilled: but rather intend to understand the reaction of one of the bargaining parties 
on promises made by the other party. In this respect the paper relates to the study of Elinder et 
al (2008), who show that in Swedish elections voters respond to the campaign promises, but 
not to the later implementation of the reforms. However, the results of this paper are much 
more extreme. First, I study the bargaining between politicians and bureaucrats, and not the 
public voting. Second, for Sweden (as well as for several other developed countries) there is 
arguably a large share of promises which are fulfilled; so, the voters act prospectively (and to 
some extent capitalize the future gains already during the voting stage). In the setting of this 
paper the federal government is already aware of the fact that promises were not fulfilled and 
still reacts on them – and it calls for a different explanation, like “preference regarding the 
content  of  communication”  discussed  above.  In  fact,  although  both  papers  conclude  that 
“words” matter, their theoretical interpretation is very different: Elinder et al. (2008) find out 
that voters, often expected to base their reaction on rational ignorance, emotions and uncer-
tainty, are in fact very much able to “capitalize” the future gains in the present decisions, 
while I show that bureaucrats and politicians, arguably very careful when making decisions 
for crucial appointments, pay more attention to what people say than to what they do. 
  One should notice though that some robustness checks call for slight adjustments in 
the interpretation of the results. First, for the Ministry of Interior it looks like federal govern-
ment takes “words” into account just for regions with weak “actual” devolution (measured by 
deeds); this subsample actually drives the results. Second, federal government had different 
attitude towards “powerful” regions with active public position and “weak” regions with high 
“words” indicators: while in the former case it preferred appointing “outsiders”, in the latter 
case it appointed “local” representatives. Hence, what one actually has to deal with is a more 
complex interactions between “words”, “deeds” and power of the region, and therefore the 
effect could be more subtle. However, it does not change the main message of the relevance 
of “just” verbal communication not supported by actual devolutionary activity in bargaining.  
In addition, the paper showed that, although the  generally declared aim of the re-
appointment policy of the federal government in Russia was to strengthen federal control over 
regional bureaucracies, the influence of factors determining bargaining power of regions on 
appointments partly provides mixed evidence: the central government seems to be more ag-
gressive in appointing bureaucrats in “weak regions” and more cautious in “strong regions”, 
which  theoretically  should  become  the  center  of  re-appointment  policies.  As  mentioned 
above, central control over appointment policies may result in re-evaluation of the degree of 
decentralization achieved in a particular country. The claim that Russia became more central-
ized in the 2000s – partly because of increasing control of the federal center over regional 
bureaucracy  –  is  currently  accepted  by  most  students  of  federalism.  However,  this  paper 
shows that even in this environment the federal appointment policy should not be overesti-
mated – and that even in spite of general centralization trend strong regions could maintain 
their bargaining position in the federation. Hence, even highly centralized federations with 
announced centralization intensions of leading political actors, may in fact provide substantial 
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and therefore the task of measuring decentralization and devolution for empirical research 
becomes even more challenging.  Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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Appendix A: Data 
Table A1: Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Change in regional bias (FSB)  83  -0.42  1.11  -3.00  2.00 
Change in regional bias (Ministry of Interior)  79  -1.34  1.62  -3.00  3.00 
Change in regional bias (prosecutor’s office)  84  -0.74  1.73  -3.00  3.00 
Contradicting acts  88  0.10  0.05  0.00  0.31 
Crime rates  87  2123.10  611.15  365.00  3537.57 
Declarations  88  2.82  0.50  1.60  4.33 
Democracy (1995-1999)  88  27.57  6.24  14.00  45.00 
Democracy (2000-2006)  84  28.80  6.31  17.00  45.00 
Distance from Moscow  88  2.64  2.93  0.00  12.87 
Dummy border region  88  0.42  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Dummy Northern Caucasus  88    0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00 
Dummy power sharing treaty  88    0.52  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Dummy Red Belt  88  0.13  0.33  0.00  1.00 
Dummy republic  88  0.23  0.42  0.00  1.00 
Fiscal transfers (1995-1999)  88  0.23  0.18  0.01  0.75 
Fiscal transfers (2000-2006)
40  88  0.29  0.20  -0.04  0.83 
Regional bias (FSB, 2000)  86  0.79  1.27  0.00  3.00 
Regional bias (FSB, 2007)  83  0.40  0.99  0.00  3.00 
Regional bias (Ministry of Interior, 2000)  88  2.26  1.18  0.00  3.00 
Regional bias (Ministry of Interior, 2007)  79  1.03  1.40  0.00  3.00 
Regional bias (Prosecutor's Office, 2000)  88  1.75  1.46  0.00  3.00 
Regional bias (Prosecutor's Office, 2007)  84  1.07  1.40  0.00  3.00 
Natural resources I  78  33.08  12.67  3.00  42.00 
Natural resources II  78    5.40  1.06  2.00  6.00 
Oil and gas (1995-1999)  88  0.02  0.10  0.00  0.79 
Oil and gas (2000-2006)  84  0.02  0.11  0.00  0.79 
Population (1995-1999)  88  1.68  1.51  0.02  8.55 
Population (2000-2006)  84  1.73  1.57  0.04  9.88 
Power of governors  88  7.00  0.69  5.70  8.50 
OVR share  88  10.74  11.93  2.24  87.98 
MEDVED share  88  26.76  8.94  1.04  70.8 
Communist Party share  88  24.27  8.43  1.82  42.13 
Share of Russians  88  0.75  0.24  0.01  0.97 
Territory  88  0.23  0.46  0.00  3.10 
                                                 
40 Negative transfers were reported in several years by the Khanty-Mansy district, which is the main source of 
the Russian oil exports and at the same time as unit subordinate to yet another constituent of the federation 
(Krasnoyarsk) subject to a specific budgeting procedure. Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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Table A2: Description of variables 
 
Name  Description  Period  Source 
Change in regional 
bias (FSB) 
Regional bias (FSB) in 2007 minus regional 
bias (FSB) in 2000 
2000-2007  Petrov, 2009 
Change in regional 
bias  (Ministry  of 
Interior) 
Regional bias (Ministry of Interior) in 2007 
minus regional bias (Ministry of Interior) in 
2000 
2000-2007  Petrov, 2009 
Change in regional 
bias  (Prosecutor’s 
Office) 
Regional  bias  (Prosecutor’s  Office  in  2007 
minus  regional  bias  (Prosecutor’s  Office)  in 
2000 
2000-2007  Petrov, 2009 
Communist  Party 
share 
Share  of  votes  for  the  Communist  Party  in 
State Duma elections 1999 
1999  Central  Electoral  Committee, 
IRENA database  
Contradicting acts  Number of acts assessed as contradicting the 
federal legislation over total  number of acts 
assessed as either contradicting or conforming 
the federal legislation 
2006  Ministry of Justice 




Declaration  Index  of  declaration  of  regional  elites  in 
1991-1995  based  on  count  of  events,  e.g. 
statements  of  sovereignty  of  the  region,  re-
quests to reallocate powers in the federation 
etc.  The higher value of index represents a 
greater support of decentralisation 
1995  Dowley, 1998 
Democracy  Index of democratisation of the region, esti-
mated by the experts of the Carnegie Centre 
in Moscow. The higher value of index repre-
sents  a  higher  degree  of  democratisation; 
annual data averaged over two time periods. 
For 2005-2006 value for 2004 is used 
1991-2004  Carnegie Centre and Independ-
ent Institute for Social Policy 
Distance  from 
Moscow 
Distance between the capital of the region and 
Moscow, thousands of km, 0 for Moscow and 
Moscow  oblast,  identical  for  St.  Petersburg 
and St. Petersburg oblast 
n.a.  Goskomstat 
Dummy  border 
region 
1 if the region has a border to any state out-
side the Russian Federation, 0 otherwise 
n.a.  Own estimation 
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Name  Description  Period  Source 
Dummy  Northern 
Caucasus 
1  for  Stavropol,  Adygeia,  Dagestan,  In-
gushetia,  Kabardino-Balkaria,  Karachaevo-
Cherkessia and Northern Ossetia, 0 otherwise 
n.a.  Own estimation 
Dummy  power-
sharing agreement 
1 if there was a power-sharing agreement in 
force by 2000, 0 otherwise  
  Garant, own estimation 
Dummy Red Belt  1 if the region had a Communist governor in 
1999, 0 otherwise 
1999  CIPKR, 2003 
Dummy republic  1 if the region has the status of a republic, 0 
otherwise  
n.a.  Own estimation 
Fiscal  transfers 
(1995-1999) 
Average  share of  fiscal transfers  from other 
budgets to the total budget expenditures of the 
region in 1995-1999 
1995-1999  Ministry  of  Finance;  State 
Treasury 
Fiscal  transfers 
(2000-2006) 
Average  share of  fiscal transfers  from other 
budgets to the total budget expenditures of the 
region in 2000-2006 
2000-2006  Ministry  of  Finance;  State 
Treasury 
MEDVED share  Share of votes for MEDVED in State Duma 
elections 1999 
1999  Central  Electoral  Committee, 
IRENA database  
Natural resources I  Ranking of regions from 1 (highest resources) 
to 42 (lowest resources) based on the deposits 
of oil, gas, coal and gold 
1998  Vainberg and Rybnikova, 2006 
Natural  resources 
II 
Ranks regions from 1 (highest resources) to 6 
(lowest resources) depending upon the value 
of  their  explored  natural  resource  deposits 
(USD)  
1996  Vainberg and Rybnikova, 2006 
Oil & gas share  Average share of oil extraction in the region 
in the total oil extraction in Russia plus share 
of the gas extraction in the region to the total 
gas extraction in Russia over two; annual data 




OVR share  Share of votes for OVR in State Duma elec-
tions 1999 
1999  Central  Electoral  Committee, 
IRENA database 
Population  Average population of the region, mln. peo-





Power  of  gover-
nors 
Index of power of regional governors, based 
on data like years in office, share on regional 
elections,  control  of  parliament  etc.  The 
higher  value  of  index  represents  a  higher 
influence of regional governor. 
1995-2000  Jarocinska, 2004 Words or Deeds – What Matters? Experience of Recentralization in Russian Security Agencies 
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Name  Description  Period  Source 
Regional  bias 
(FSB) 
Index  of  connections  between  director  of 
regional FSB office and the region, from 0 to 
3, 0 = no connections, 3 = strong connections 
2000; 2007  Petrov, 2009 
Regional  bias 
(Ministry  of  Inte-
rior) 
Index  of  connections  between  director  of 
regional  Ministry  of  Interior  office  and  the 
region, from 0 to 3, 0 = no connections, 3 = 
strong connections 
2000; 2007  Petrov, 2009 
Regional  bias 
(Prosecutor’s 
Office) 
Index  of  connections  between  director  of 
regional  Prosecutor’s  Office  office  and  the 
region, from 0 to 3, 0 = no connections, 3 = 
strong connections 
2000; 2007  Petrov, 2009 
Share of Russians   Share of ethnic Russians in the region’s popu-
lation 
2002  Russia’s Census, 2002 
Territory  Territory  of  the  region,  mln.  sq.km,  0  for 
Moscow and St. Petersburg 
n.a.  Goskomstat 
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Appendix B: Convergence of regional bias 
Table B1: Personnel appointment for the Ministry of Interior, dep.var.: difference in regional bias index 



























Regional  bias 
2000  -0.694***  -0.691***  -0.708***  -0.694***  -0.709***  -1.172***  -1.177***  -1.403***  -1.169***  -1.401*** 
  (0.125)  (0.124)  (0.124)  (0.126)  (0.125)  (0.216)  (0.216)  (0.272)  (0.214)  (0.270) 
Dummy 
republic  -1.234***  -1.334***  -2.546***  -1.233***  -2.549***  -1.589*  -1.828**  -5.094***  -1.591*  -5.091*** 
  (0.401)  (0.390)  (0.489)  (0.404)  (0.490)  (0.842)  (0.835)  (1.446)  (0.827)  (1.444) 
Dummy 
border region  -0.586*  -0.600*  -0.416  -0.586*  -0.419  -0.946*  -0.956*  -0.657  -0.939*  -0.648 
  (0.327)  (0.325)  (0.327)  (0.326)  (0.328)  (0.555)  (0.556)  (0.593)  (0.552)  (0.590) 
Distance 
from Moscow  -0.020  -0.036  -0.081  -0.021  -0.080  -0.026  -0.062  -0.158  -0.037  -0.164 
  (0.058)  (0.064)  (0.056)  (0.058)  (0.055)  (0.102)  (0.112)  (0.122)  (0.099)  (0.120) 
Share  of 
Russians  -2.985***  -2.916***  -1.722*  -2.980***  -1.746  -4.411**  -4.290**  -2.582  -4.242**  -2.522 
  (0.952)  (0.959)  (1.018)  (1.013)  (1.078)  (1.963)  (1.988)  (1.682)  (2.032)  (1.749) 
Territory  0.170  0.188  0.244  0.169  0.251  0.182  0.234  0.320  0.135  0.301 
  (0.545)  (0.562)  (0.534)  (0.560)  (0.550)  (0.994)  (1.057)  (0.974)  (0.949)  (0.959) 
Population 
(2000-2006)  0.071  0.072  0.059  0.070  0.061  0.060  0.070  0.050  0.042  0.042 
  (0.097)  (0.097)  (0.085)  (0.100)  (0.090)  (0.148)  (0.148)  (0.133)  (0.153)  (0.143) 
Oil  and  gas 
(2000-2006)  -2.962**  -2.976**  -4.223***  -2.969**  -4.197***  -8.318***  -7.900***  -15.260***  -8.680***  -15.415*** 
  (1.194)  (1.170)  (1.324)  (1.225)  (1.369)  (2.601)  (2.653)  (4.475)  (2.647)  (4.618) 
Democracy 
(2000-2006)  0.020  0.020  0.004  0.020  0.004  0.044  0.045  0.028  0.039  0.025 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.057)  (0.053)  (0.059) 
Dummy 
Northern 
Caucasus   0.578  0.569  1.292**  0.579  1.290**  1.077  1.098  2.952**  1.123  2.954** 
  (0.653)  (0.657)  (0.636)  (0.661)  (0.643)  (1.248)  (1.249)  (1.197)  (1.265)  (1.193) 
Contradicting 
acts    2.283  2.280    2.251    4.848  4.696    4.805 
    (2.851)  (2.635)    (2.606)    (4.527)  (4.425)    (4.326) 
Declarations      1.552***    1.555***      3.765***    3.749*** 
      (0.483)    (0.480)      (1.305)    (1.292) 
Power  of 
governors        0.006  -0.026        0.18  0.083 
        (0.280)  (0.271)        -0.468  -0.49 
Constant  2.422**  2.186*  -2.277  2.384  -2.111           
  (1.073)  (1.106)  (1.849)  (2.165)  (2.707)           
Observations  79  79  79  79  79  79  79  79  79  79 
R
2  0.415  0.419  0.485  0.415  0.485           
Pseudo R
2            0.210  0.214  0.282  0.210  0.282 
LR  propor-
tional  odds 
test            58.35**  59.21**  55.00  57.61**  56.72 
J.-B. test  5.988*  6.022**  4.559  5.979*  4.581           
 
Note: See Table 1. Outliers are: (B1): Khabarovsk, Briansk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Lenin-
gradskaia; (B2): Khabarovsk, Krasoniarsk, Briansk, Leningradskaya, Nizhniy Novgorod,  Novosibirsk, Omsk, 
Vologda, Sakha; (B3): Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk,  Riazan, Sverdlovsk; (B4): Khabarovsk, Briansk, 
Nizhniy Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Leningradskaia, Omsk; (B5): Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk, Riazan, 
Sverdlovskaia. Exclusion of outliers does not lead to any change in any regression, with the exception of oil and 
gas in regression (B2), which becomes insignificant, but holds its sign. 
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Table B2: Personnel appointment for Prosecutor’s Office, dep.var.: difference in regional bias index be-




























bias 2000  -0.752***  -0.767***  -0.770***  -0.754***  -0.770***  -1.581***  -1.888***  -1.890***  -1.584***  -1.889*** 
  (0.098)  (0.096)  (0.099)  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.314)  (0.335)  (0.334)  (0.311)  (0.334) 
Dummy 
republic  0.469  0.719  0.674  0.465  0.672  0.660  1.279  1.247  0.628  1.242 
  (0.593)  (0.574)  (0.661)  (0.605)  (0.670)  (0.999)  (1.069)  (1.254)  (1.029)  (1.279) 
Dummy 
border 
region  -0.341  -0.291  -0.285  -0.322  -0.282  -0.627  -0.507  -0.503  -0.582  -0.498 
  (0.318)  (0.310)  (0.318)  (0.324)  (0.323)  (0.557)  (0.578)  (0.590)  (0.563)  (0.586) 
Distance 
from 
Moscow  0.117  0.154**  0.152**  0.109  0.151**  0.161  0.248*  0.247*  0.146  0.245* 
  (0.070)  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.075)  (0.075)  (0.146)  (0.128)  (0.130)  (0.156)  (0.147) 
Share  of 
Russians   1.006  0.770  0.815  1.095  0.832  1.409  0.787  0.810  1.554  0.829 
  (1.158)  (1.127)  (1.237)  (1.181)  (1.268)  (1.859)  (1.938)  (2.058)  (1.837)  (2.057) 
Territory  -0.502**  -0.530**  -0.528**  -0.526**  -0.532**  -0.863  -1.047*  -1.047*  -0.926*  -1.055* 
  (0.215)  (0.206)  (0.209)  (0.214)  (0.205)  (0.595)  (0.628)  (0.629)  (0.563)  (0.591) 
Population 
(2000-
2006)  0.262***  0.260***  0.260***  0.253**  0.258***  0.419**  0.439**  0.439**  0.405**  0.437** 
  (0.095)  (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.097)  (0.092)  (0.191)  (0.192)  (0.191)  (0.195)  (0.199) 
Oil and gas 
(2000-
2006)  2.302  2.321*  2.280  2.185  2.258  3.431*  3.926**  3.900**  3.231  3.876* 
  (1.582)  (1.391)  (1.430)  (1.624)  (1.501)  (1.970)  (1.811)  (1.925)  (2.054)  (2.096) 
Democracy 
(2000-
2006)  -0.056*  -0.057**  -0.058*  -0.059*  -0.058*  -0.094*  -0.104*  -0.104*  -0.100*  -0.105 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.052)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.057)  (0.064) 
Dummy 
Northern 
Caucasus  -0.138  -0.093  -0.061  -0.126  -0.060  -0.242  -0.146  -0.126  -0.222  -0.124 
  (0.729)  (0.773)  (0.827)  (0.721)  (0.830)  (1.157)  (1.385)  (1.466)  (1.131)  (1.459) 
Contra-
dicting acts    -6.406**  -6.414**    -6.380**    -16.474**  -16.466**    -16.408** 
    (3.006)  (3.022)    (3.083)    (7.313)  (7.316)    (7.575) 
Declarati-
ons      0.059    0.058      0.039    0.038 
      (0.540)    (0.542)      (0.979)    (0.978) 
Power  of 
governors        0.097  0.019        0.191  0.024 
        (0.283)  (0.281)        (0.486)  (0.485) 
Constant  0.857  1.563  1.394  0.232  1.272           
  (1.255)  (1.233)  (2.048)  (2.035)  (2.731)           
Observati-
ons  84  84  84  84  84  84  84  84  84  84 
R
2  0.472  0.500  0.500  0.473  0.500           
Pseudo R
2            0.281  0.320  0.320  0.282  0.321 
LR  pro-
portional 
odds test            70.45***  90.44***  90.58***  71.99***  90.73*** 
J.-B. test  5.803*  5.300*  5.228*  5.739*  5.202*           
Note: see Table 1. Outliers  are in (B11) Lipetsk, Bashkortostan, Buriatia,  Novosibirsk, Saratov and Lenin-
gradskaya; (B12): Khabarovsk, Amur, Leningradskaya, Lipetsk, Novosibirsk, Bashkortostan, Buriatia; (B13) 
Leningradskaya, Lipetsk, Novosibirsk, Bashkortostan and Buriatia, (B14): the same regions as in (B13) and 
Saratov and (B15) Khabarovsk, Buriatia Lipetsk, Leningradskaya, Novosibirsk and Bashkortostan. There are no 
changes after exclusion of outliers. 
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Table B3: Personnel appointment for Federal Security Service, dep.var.: difference in regional bias index 



























Regional  bias 
2000  -0.581***  -0.581***  -0.586***  -0.586***  -0.592***  -1.703***  -1.697***  -1.724***  -1.681***  -1.703*** 
  (0.114)  (0.115)  (0.116)  (0.117)  (0.119)  (0.418)  (0.421)  (0.424)  (0.414)  (0.419) 
Dummy 
republic  -0.490  -0.505  -0.652*  -0.493  -0.656*  -2.249**  -2.151**  -2.710**  -2.274**  -2.709** 
  (0.326)  (0.330)  (0.373)  (0.328)  (0.377)  (0.990)  (1.039)  (1.330)  (1.021)  (1.344) 
Dummy 
border region  0.048  0.044  0.058  0.037  0.047  0.206  0.244  0.295  0.301  0.377 
  (0.199)  (0.204)  (0.210)  (0.194)  (0.203)  (0.756)  (0.798)  (0.846)  (0.676)  (0.751) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.045  0.043  0.038  0.048  0.041  0.090  0.111  0.097  0.076  0.084 
  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.141)  (0.150)  (0.156)  (0.137)  (0.152) 
Share  of 
Russians  -0.141  -0.137  -0.013  -0.190  -0.065  -2.119  -2.056  -1.655  -1.685  -1.278 
  (0.733)  (0.737)  (0.750)  (0.765)  (0.779)  (2.300)  (2.332)  (2.398)  (2.462)  (2.442) 
Territory  -0.507***  -0.506***  -0.498***  -0.496***  -0.485***  -3.389*  -3.534**  -3.694**  -3.694*  -3.958** 
  (0.169)  (0.169)  (0.168)  (0.173)  (0.173)  (1.776)  (1.764)  (1.846)  (1.954)  (1.959) 
Population 
(2000-2006)  0.127*  0.127*  0.126*  0.131*  0.131*  0.323  0.327*  0.321  0.283  0.284 
  (0.072)  (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.074)  (0.075)  (0.199)  (0.196)  (0.201)  (0.221)  (0.223) 
Oil and gas 
(2000-2006)  0.879  0.877  0.719  0.918  0.757  5.753*  5.987*  5.612*  5.755*  5.613* 
  (0.749)  (0.761)  (0.742)  (0.748)  (0.740)  (3.288)  (3.286)  (3.314)  (3.274)  (3.324) 
Democracy 
(2000-2006)  -0.007  -0.007  -0.008  -0.005  -0.007  -0.001  -0.000  -0.005  -0.012  -0.015 
  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.066)  (0.070)  (0.068) 
Dummy 
Northern 
Caucasus  0.160  0.156  0.237  0.149  0.229  0.061  0.098  0.347  0.159  0.430 
  (0.275)  (0.276)  (0.291)  (0.283)  (0.297)  (0.708)  (0.718)  (0.734)  (0.801)  (0.772) 
Contradicting 
acts    0.290  0.311    0.241    -1.503  -1.487    -1.396 
    (1.311)  (1.324)    (1.397)    (4.522)  (4.453)    (4.311) 
Declarations      0.184    0.190      0.664    0.623 
      (0.271)    (0.273)      (1.067)    (1.115) 
Power  of 
governors        -0.040  -0.044        0.332  0.308 
        (0.136)  (0.143)        (0.695)  (0.721) 
Constant  0.199  0.177  -0.348  0.472  -0.058           
  (0.760)  (0.775)  (1.172)  (1.284)  (1.550)           
Observations  83  83  83  83  83  83  83  83  83  83 
R
2  0.543  0.544  0.546  0.544  0.546           
Pseudo R
2            0.331  0.331  0.333  0.332  0.334 
LR  propor-
tional  odds 
test            71.85***  72.22***  72.30***  77.64***  80.47*** 
J.-B. test  7.881**  8.193**  7.489**  7.666**  7.178**           
Note: See Table 1. Analysis of robustness of regression through exclusion of outliers in regression (B21), (B22) 
and (B24) is impossible, since in order to achieve non-significant Jarque-Bera most regressions should be ex-
cluded. Outliers in (B23) are Khanty Mansi, Aginsk Buriat, Moscow City, St. Petersburg, Altai Krai, Amur, 
Briansk,  Cheliabinsk,  Kaluga,  Kemerovo,  Leningradskaya,  Moscow  Oblast,  Murmansk,  Nizhiny  Novgorod, 
Penza, Rostov, Smolensk, Sverdlovskaya, Tambov, Ulianovsk, Voronezh, Chuvashia,  Komi, Tatarstan, Tyva, 
Udmurtia. In (B25) Krasnodar is also an outlier and Rostov is not, and other outliers coincide. After exclusion of 
outliers in (23) and (25) population and dummy republic become insignificant, but maintain their sign.  
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